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During the 1970s and 1980s, developing countries, skeptical of foreign investment, im-
posed several barriers on entry of foreign capital. However, the late 1980s and 1990s marked
the onset of globalization, which integrated the whole world into a single global economy.
The once-conservative developing nations, realizing the multifarious benefits of foreign direct
investment (FDI), began encouraging entry of foreign firms, using various incentives, such
as tax holidays, production subsidies, cash grants, labor training grants, and import duty
exemptions. Gradually, FDI and foreign aid became two very important sources of foreign
capital for these capital-constrained economies. This dissertation is focused on studying
if there is any kind of relationship between foreign aid and private investment in recipient
countries. FDI is a decision made by foreign investors on the basis of profitability of invest-
ment, whereas foreign aid is a political decision made by governments of donor countries on
the basis of need for financial assistance by developing countries. We model foreign aid as
an exogenous factor in allocation of foreign direct investment, along with other variables, to
estimate the effect of aid on investment. Among the factors affecting FDI, infrastructure is
considered to be an important one, in allocation of funds across developing countries. This
dissertation is arranged as follows.
iv
In chapter 2, we introduce the term “socioeconomic” infrastructure and create an
index, by combining several components of infrastructure, using the multivariate technique
of principal components. Prior to creating the index, we employ the technique of multiple
imputation to deal with missing data. Our measure of socioeconomic infrastructure contains
elements of physical infrastructure, such as transportation facilities, telecommunication
facilities, consumption demand for energy and electricity, as well as social infrastructure
components, such as voice and accountability, political stability and the absence of violence
and terrorism, rule of law, control of corruption, government effectiveness, and regulatory
quality.
In chapter 3, we develop a theoretical model to address the research question: Does
foreign aid impede or encourage foreign direct investment in developing nations? Our the-
ory demonstrates that foreign aid used by the recipient country in financing a public input
(known as development aid) encourages foreign direct investment. We also empirically ad-
dress the same issue by modeling foreign aid as a determinant of foreign direct investment,
along with a host of other factors, including our computed index of socioeconomic infras-
tructure. Our analysis shows that public consumption aid (foreign aid used for financing
consumption expenses) does crowd out private investment in current account surplus de-
veloping countries, whereas development aid crowds in private investment in the presence
of sound macroeconomic, political, legal, and administrative machineries.
In chapter 4, we build a panel econometric model to explain the factors underlying
socioeconomic infrastructure in developing countries. Our results indicate that countries
with higher per capita income, a prominently large government, high investment demand,
and large government revenue tend to have better infrastructure.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Capital accumulation plays a vital role in the development process of any developing
economy. Low investable capital (either due to low savings or, improper allocation of
resources) often acts as a bottleneck for developing countries and stalls growth of the country
in its early stages of development [1].1 Low-income developing countries are thereby forced
to depend upon foreign capital to break this capital constraint.
During the 70’s and early 80’s, unsure of the consequences of foreign investment, many
developing countries discouraged foreign investors and firms from investing in their countries
by restricting capital investment in key areas of the economy [2]. But during the late 80’s
and 90’s, there was a change in the conservative sentiment2 of these developing countries
and they started opening up their economies to foreign countries and also actively engaged
themselves in competition for foreign investment [2]. The developing countries gradually
recognized the positive impacts of foreign investment (portfolio and direct), over and above
the incoming capital, such as, technology import by the multinational enterprises3 (MNEs)
and spillover effects in terms of better governance, improved work environment, and more
educated workforce. Even since 1990’s, the world economy has witnessed a slow but steady
increase in foreign direct investment into the developing countries [3].
According to the United Nations’s World Investment Report published in 2004 [3],
growth in global FDI flows to developing countries had been far from impressive during
the 1990’s. Since 1990, FDI inflows to developing countries increased very gradually from
1Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, approvingly quotes a Massachusetts Institute of Technology study in this
regard, “There is a minimum level of resources that must be devoted to a development program if it has to
have any chance of success. Launching a country into self-sustaining growth is like getting an airplane off
the ground. There is a critical ground speed which must be passed before the craft can become airborne....”
2Restrictions imposed with respect to entry of foreign capital into the country.
3Multinational enterprises can be domestic or foreign owned, but, we assume foreign owned corporations
investing in developing countries in our study.
2around $20 billion to around a little over $200 billion by the end of 2004. Among the
developing countries, the best performers were the countries in Asia and Pacific, followed
by Latin America and the Caribbean, and Africa.
With the onset of global financial crisis in 2007–2008, turmoil in financial markets and
worldwide economic downturn affected global FDI in 2008 and in the first half of 2009.
After uninterrupted growth in FDI activity in the period 2003–2007, global FDI inflows
fell by 14% in 2008 to $1697 billion, from a record high of $1979 billion in 2007. In the
first half of 2009, FDI flows fell at an accelerated rate. However, during this period, FDI
inflows into developing countries were less affected than those into developed countries.
Developing countries seemed relatively insulated from the global financial crisis, as their
financial systems were less closely interlinked with the developed countries. FDI inflows
into developing countries increased in 2008, but at 17%, this was a lower rate than in
previous years. FDI inflows increased considerably in Africa by 27% and in Latin America
& the Caribbean by 13%, continuing the upward trend of the preceding years for both
regions. In South Asia, FDI inflows continued to grow considerably, rising by 49%, whereas
they decreased in South-East Asia by about 14%.
According to the United Nations’s Global Investment Trends Monitor report [4], global
FDI flows had risen marginally by 1%, from $1114 billion in 2009 to $1122 billion in 2010,
and developing and transition economies, for the first time, absorbed more than half of the
global FDI flows. A more recent statistic reported by UNCTAD’s World Investment Report,
2011 [5], said that FDI flows had reached $1.24 trillion in 2010, which was still 15% below the
pre-crisis (global financial crisis of 2008) level, even when global trade had reached their pre-
crisis levels. Also, developing and transition economies had claimed more than half of the
global FDI [5]. There had also been an increase in outward FDI from developing countries
to other less developed countries in the South. In contrast, FDI to developed countries had
reduced substantially. However, developing countries, such as Africa and South Asia, had
witnessed a fall in share of FDI during this time, whereas, the major emerging economies
of East and South-East Asia experienced strong growth in FDI flows [5].
3In this backdrop of steady growth of FDI over the last five decades or so, theoretical
as well as empirical analysts have studied various aspects of FDI such as; impact of FDI on
developing countries, various government policies of developing countries to attract FDI,
factors behind the allocation of FDI across developed and developing countries, so on and so
forth. In one of his seminal publications, Findlay [6] demonstrated the technology transfer
aspect of MNE, modeling theoretically, the technology transfer between MNE and the
recipient economy, and proposed that rate of technology transfer is directly related to the
relative disparity in the development levels of the countries at the outset of the technology
transfer process. Another pioneering empirical work by Harrison and Aitken [7], using
disaggregated Venezuelan panel data, however revealed insignificant technology spillover
from foreign to domestic firms, whereas, Caves [8] found evidence for significant spillover
effect in terms of reduced disparity in level of productivity between foreign-managed firms
and domestic firms analyzing Australian domestic manufacturing sector.
MNEs have been increasingly encouraged by the newly developing countries by various
instruments, such as, tax holidays, production subsidies, cash grants, labor training grants,
import duty exemptions etc. Tax holiday phenomenon, observed during the 80’s, was inde-
pendently studied by Doyle and Wijnbergen [9] and Bond and Samuelson [10]. Government
subsidies also act as bait for foreign capital, where subsidy schedules and other incentives are
posted by governments of developing countries to lure MNE into operating in their country.
Haaparanta [11] models such a strategic interaction of two developing countries competing
for a larger share of foreign direct investment by a MNE where national governments act
as principals and the MNE as the single agent. Governments are assumed to maximize the
wage income generated by the MNE’s investment. It is shown that in the equilibrium of
this game, a high wage country may be able to attract investment even when all countries
use subsidies. Also, a country may choose to pay the highest subsidies even if it attracts
less investment than in the unsubsidized regime.
Yet another instrument developing countries often use to attract foreign companies
is infrastructure. Governments of developing countries actively get involved in improving
4socioeconomic infrastructure to project the country as a favorable destination for MNEs.
Infrastructure is a very broad term, and, in this dissertation, we define it not only by
the physical infrastructure in an economy, but also by the legal, political, and adminis-
trative machineries in a country. Infrastructure provides the business environment in a
country. Strengthening of socio-economic infrastructure, apart from developing a strong
social overhead capital,4 also implies strengthening of these legal systems to mobilize and
allocate resources more efficiently and mitigate the risk associated with risky production
atmosphere in developing countries.
There’s a rich, yet controversial, body of empirical literature on determinants of FDI
across developing countries. Factors such as market size has an unambiguously positive
effect on FDI [13–16]. Effect of labor cost on FDI is controversial. While some studies
[8, 15, 17] report a positive relationship between labor cost and FDI, Pistoresi [18] reports
a negative relation, whereas Tsai [16] and Lucas [19] find the effect of labor cost on FDI
to be insignificant. Trade barrier is an important factor in determining flow of FDI across
nations. While Lunn [20] finds a positive relationship with FDI, Culem [21] and Blonigen
[22] report a negative and insignificant relationship, respectively. Growth rate of GDP
seems to have a positive impact on FDI [21, 23], whereas Tsai [16] reports an insignificant
effect on the same. Effect of trade openness on FDI is not without controversy. Some
studies [18,24] report a positive relationship, whereas Wheeler and Mody [15] report trade
openness to have an insignificant effect on FDI. While Dollar [25], Lucas [26], and Pistoresi
[18] report a negative relation of trade deficit with FDI, Tsai [16] and Shamsuddin [27]
report a positive relationship. Another crucial factor is the exchange rates of the recipient
economy. Edwards [24] demonstrates a positive relationship between exchange rate and FDI;
however, some studies [22, 28, 29] do report a negative relationship, whereas Blonigen [30]
reports insignificant relationship of exchange rates with FDI. Tax on foreign investment
generally discourages FDI [31–33]; however, Swenson [34] reports a positive relationship,
whereas [15,35] report insignificant effect. A very comprehensive literature review has been
4Social overhead capital is a social device that enables us to live financially prosperous lives, improve
the level of our culture, and maintain an appealing society with a human touch [12].
5conducted by Charkarbarti [36] and Blonigen [37].
We explore another aspect of FDI, namely, its interaction with foreign aid. The dis-
sertation is structured as follows. In the first essay, we define socioeconomic infrastructure
and develop an index that captures the basic production facilities available in a developing
economy. We consider factors reflecting social overhead capital as well as factors affecting
the legal, political and administrative atmosphere in the country. Socioeconomic infras-
tructure is an important factor in mobilizing foreign direct investment across developing
countries. We create the index of socioeconomic infrastructure using principal component
analysis, a statistical tool for summarizing information available in a multivariate system
into a smaller dimension, where coefficient of each variable indicates its relative importance
in the composite measure. Our dataset was riddled with missing information, which is a
ubiquitous problem faced by researchers working with developing countries. As a remedy
to missing information, we implement multiple imputation technique, which allows us to
generate a distribution for each missing cell in our data matrix, keeping the observed values
unchanged, generating ‘m’ (> 1) completed data matrices. We then carry out independent
statistical analysis on each of the ‘m’ completed datasets, and combine the results obtained
from statistical analysis of each dataset, using Rubin’s formula [38], in order to take into
consideration the uncertainty behind each missing value. Multiple imputation is a better
way of dealing with missing data compared to the otherwise popular method of list wise
deletion as it helps in avoiding bias due to reduced sample size [39–41]. We implement this
technique wherever we encounter missing data throughout our research.
In the second essay, we analyze the relationship between foreign direct investment and
foreign aid, controlling for factors affecting the flow of FDI across developing countries. The
issue regarding trade-off between foreign direct investment and foreign aid was raised by
Beladi and Oladi [42], where they formulate and analyze a three-good general equilibrium
model to show that foreign aid, if used in financing public consumption such as government
budget deficit, or, poverty alleviation programs in developing economies, may crowd out
foreign direct investment under certain factor intensity conditions. In a similar set-up,
6we theoretically and empirically analyze the case where foreign aid is used in financing
development projects, and we demonstrate that foreign aid would crowd in foreign direct
investment, the degree of crowding-in effect depends upon a factor intensity condition. We
also empirically test the proposition put forward by Beladi and Oladi [42] .
In the third essay, we model our constructed index of socioeconomic infrastructure
in a panel data set-up to explain the factors that determine socioeconomic infrastructure
in developing economies. A country’s socioeconomic infrastructure depends upon the the
demand and supply conditions in the country. We explore the possible factors responsible
for driving socioeconomic infrastructure in an empirical model.
7Chapter 2
An Index of Socioeconomic Infrastructure
2.1 Introduction
Infrastructure is defined as the basic physical and organizational framework required for
production of goods, services and amenities essential for an economy to function smoothly.
The term infrastructure, on one hand, refers to the social overhead capital that enhances the
productive capacity of an economy, such as roads, bridges, water supply, sewers, electrical
grids, telecommunications, and so forth; and on the other hand, refers to the legal, political
and administrative machineries of the nation that enables sustenance and enhancement
of societal living conditions. Infrastructure facilitates production of goods and services,
distribution of finished products to markets, and provides basic social services, such as;
schools, hospitals, restaurants, parks and other recreational facilities.
Infrastructure is important for an economy for the services it provides. It lays the foun-
dation that enables productive activities in an economy which also enhances the business
environment in the country. The stronger the infrastructure, so it is assumed, the better
will be the productive efficiency of the country. It is, however, very difficult to define and
therefore quantify infrastructure, even though there have been earlier attempts at defining
it. There might be several parameters that define various aspects of infrastructure which
can be combined to create an index of overall infrastructure, using principal component
analysis (PCA). In one of the very early papers, Ram [43] uses principal component anal-
ysis to derive a quality of life index by combining factors such as per capita income, basic
needs fulfillment, and other possible indicators of well-being. The paper also presents two
illustrative applications of principal component analysis. The first one develops a compos-
ite index based on the three physical quality of life indicator (PQLI) constituents and per
capita GNP for 147 countries. In the other, a composite index of basic needs fulfillment
8is first computed for 82 countries, and then a more inclusive measure, that also takes into
account per capita GNP, is derived. We follow similar guidelines for computing the two
primary indices, physical infrastructure (PI) and social infrastructure (SI) indices, and then
combine the two indices to create the socioeconomic infrastructure (SEI) index.
In the ADB working paper titled, ‘Governance, institutions, and regional infrastructure
in Asia’, De [44] analyses the impact of governance and institutions on regional infrastruc-
ture. His study suggests that higher income, better governance and stronger institutions
have a strong, positive influence on regional infrastructure. To proxy for regional infrastruc-
ture, he creates an index of physical infrastructure comprising of variables such as roadways,
railways, airports, seaports, telecommunications and electricity, employing principal com-
ponents. The first component of his index explains 58.9% of the total variation in data, two
components together could explain 70.2%. The study concentrates on a subset of Asian
countries. Several countries had to be dropped off from the analysis due to unavailability
of sufficient data on all variables.
A similar approach is used by the World Bank for computation of the human devel-
opment indicator (HDI), where the composite HDI index is created in two stages. First,
the education index, comprising of factors, adult literacy and gross enrollment, is created.
In the second stage, they combine the education index, life expectancy index, and GDP in
purchasing power parity (PPP) terms in US dollars, to compute the human development
index (HDI), employing principal component analysis. We follow similar guidelines. In the
first stage, we create two separate indices for physical as well as social infrastructure, then
in the second stage, we combine the two indices, using principal components, to create an
index of socioeconomic infrastructure.
However, our data was riddled with missingness, for which we had to employ the
method of multiple imputation to scientifically fill-in the missing cells. Multiple imputation
is a Monte Carlo approach to analysis of incomplete data. The underlying philosophy
of multiple imputation is to solve an incomplete data problem by repeatedly solving the







mis , after which the ‘m’ complete datasets are analyzed by
standard complete data statistical methods. The variability among the ‘m’ results provides
an estimate about the uncertainty due to missing data, which when combined with the
sample variation in each dataset provides a single estimate of variance for each parameter
of interest.1
Missingness may occur due to subjects dropping out in the middle of a survey, un-
availability of sensitive information of subjects or countries over certain years in non-survey
data, poor maintenance of archives by data collection agencies and incomplete compilation
of statistical data by organizations and has serious implications for estimation of economet-
ric models employing missing data. As a remedy to incomplete data, investigators use list
wise or pairwise deletion, ad hoc methods of filling in values such as by educated guesswork,
mean imputation, or, regression-based single imputation. However, such methods may ren-
der the sample unrepresentative and any result drawn from such unrepresentative sample
maybe statistically biased and inconsistent. Mean imputation entails replacing the missing
value with subject-specific variable mean, whereas, regression substitution uses regression
analysis to replace missing values by predicting one variable based on other variables. How-
ever, mean imputation may artificially reduce the variability of the variables and diminish
its relationship with other variables, therefore affecting the reliability of the estimates. On
the contrary, multiple imputation is a scientific procedure that fills in missing values by
generating ‘m’ (m > 1) complete datasets where missing values are filled in keeping the
observed values unchanged.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we describe the data
used for creating the socio-economic infrastructure index and our rationale for inclusion of
each measure in our model, and the mathematical treatment for incomplete data, followed
by a section on principal component analysis, results and policy discussion. Section 2.4
concludes.
1A detailed description of multiple imputation technique is presented in appendix A.1.
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2.2 Data and methodology
In our research, we have constructed an index of socioeconomic infrastructure for 145
developing countries2 in our study. Tables D.1 and D.2 (in the appendix) list all the
developing countries involved in our study.
In order to construct an index of socioeconomic infrastructure, we construct two basic
indices, the physical infrastructure index (PII), and the social infrastructure index (SII).
Physical infrastructure captures the resources available to aid production directly or indi-
rectly, such as, transportation facilities, telecommunication facilities, consumption demand
for energy and electricity (refer to table A.1, in appendix A, for description of variables).
There are several modes of transportation, such as roadways, railways, airways, seaports.
We have included only roadways because this is the most basic measure of transportation
facility. Many countries do not use air or water transport and therefore it is not possible
to obtain data on these parameters. Since our objective is to represent transportation in-
frastructure, we use data on roadways. To represent roadways, we collected data on road
density per 100 square kilometers of the country. Road density is the ratio of the length
of the country’s total road network to the country’s total land area. The road network
includes all roads in the country such as motorways, highways, main (national) roads, sec-
ondary (regional) roads, and other urban and rural roads. Road density indicates how
well the country’s land area is connected by roads. Higher road density implies better
transportation facilities. Then, we consider electricity and energy consumption per capita,
respectively. These two variables give some idea about the consumers’ power resource re-
quirement which throws some light on the intensity of productive economic activity in the
country. The higher the electricity and energy consumption in the country, the more de-
veloped the country is, relative to other economies. Telecommunication infrastructure is
2We consider all the 155 countries listed by International Monetary Fund (IMF) as developing countries.
Please look at IMF’s World Economic Outlook Report, April 2011. However, World Bank does not have any
data on South Sudan, as a result of which we had to drop South Sudan from our list of developing countries.
We could create the social infrastructure index for 154 countries. For creating the physical infrastructure
index, we had to drop 9 more countries; Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Montenegro,
Nauru, Palau, Serbia, Sudan, Timor-Leste, and Tuvalu owing to absence of data for every single year. When
the two indices were combined to create the socio-economic infrastructure index, we could generate the index
for 145 developing countries.
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another important ingredient of physical infrastructure. We concentrate on the two repre-
sentative variables, telephone mainlines per 100 population and internet subscription per
100 population. Stronger telecommunication infrastructure is reflected in stronger physi-
cal infrastructure. We obtain our raw data from the world development indicators (WDI)
compiled by the World Bank. The data on electricity and energy consumed per capita is
obtained from a US energy information administration report [45].
Social infrastructure captures the legal, political and administrative atmosphere of the
country that facilitates smooth operation of production processes in the economy. It is the
direct outcome of the quality of governance in the country. As quoted by De [44], according
to papers appearing in Econlit, world governance was mentioned 5 times in the 1970’s, by
the end of 2008, reference to ‘governance’ has increased to 33177 with ‘economic gover-
nance’ appearing 192 times, and ‘corporate governance’ appearing 9717 times [46]. This
simple statistic shows how the term ‘governance’ has gained importance during the last
four decades. According to Dixit [46], good governance has eight major characteristics. It
is participatory, consensus-oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and effi-
cient, equitable and inclusive, and mindful of the rule of law. In a paper titled ‘Governance
Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators (1996–2008)’, Kaufmann et
al. [47] estimated six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability, political stability
and the absence of violence and terrorism, rule of law, control of corruption, government ef-
fectiveness and regulatory quality, for 212 countries and territories for 1996, 1998, 2000, and
annually for 2002–2008. They are based on several hundred individual variables measuring
perceptions of governance, drawn from 35 separate data sources constructed by 33 different
organizations from around the world. These individual measures are assigned to categories
capturing the six dimensions of governance. Using an unobserved components model, they
constructed the six aggregate governance indicators in each period, where, each of the six
component scores varies between -2.5 to 2.5, with better outcomes associated with better
scores. Quality of governance can be measured by its various attributes; voice and account-
ability, political stability and the absence of violence and terrorism, rule of law, control of
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corruption, government effectiveness, and, regulatory quality. For our purposes, we created
an index of quality of governance or, social infrastructure as we put it, by combining all the
six measures of governance using principal component analysis.
Our index of socio-economic infrastructure comprises of the two indices; physical in-
frastructure and social infrastructure index, again combined by principal components.
Prior to applying principal component analysis, our dataset had to be treated for
missing data (refer to table 2.1 (below) for the missingness pattern in the variables).
Table 2.1: Missingness pattern in SEI variables
Variable % of missingness
Road density per 100 square kms (road) 0
Electricity consumption per capita (elec) 38.24
Energy consumption per capita (energy) 0.80
Internet subscribers per 100 population (inter) 1.61
Telephone mainlines per 100 population (tele) 0.38
Voice and accountability (voice) 0.36
Political stability and absence of violence and terrorism (pol) 1.23
Rule of law (rule) 0.72
Control of corruption (corrupt) 1.37
Government effectiveness (gov) 0.58
Regulatory quality (reg) 1.37
We employ multiple imputation technique. A detailed discussion of multiple imputation
can be found in appendix A.1. Incomplete data has been a ubiquitous problem in all
disciplines of social science. Missingness may be a result of interviewees opting out of
the questionnaire in the middle of a survey or simply unavailability of data in non-survey
studies. Missingness has been ignored by most empirical analysts in previous studies in this
area. Popular methods include list wise deletion which deletes subjects that contain any
missing observation. This practice not only reduces the number of subjects in the study
but also lead to inefficient, biased estimates or estimates valid only for a specific subsample.
Imputing the missing values by their subject-specific mean also introduces bias into the
estimates.
Multiple imputation is a three step procedure to fill in missing values. Step 1 generates
‘m’ (m > 1) complete datasets where missing values are filled in, keeping the observed
13
values unchanged, to account for uncertainty about the imputation model. In step 2, each
of the completed datasets are analyzed using complete case estimation techniques. Step 3
combines all the estimates by taking a simple average, accounting for the uncertainty of the
fit of the model [38].
We carry out estimation for each of the complete imputed datasets and save each
estimate and its standard error. For calculating overall estimate and overall standard error,






where Qˆj is the regression coefficient obtained from j = 1, 2, ....m number of imputed
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The overall degrees of freedom are given by







The computed ‘t’-statistic can be compared to the students’ ‘t’-distribution.
We conduct multiple imputation with the help of software Amelia in R, which requires
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the dataset to be multivariate normal for the algorithm to run accurately, and for the vari-
ables to meet the assumption of multivariate normality, we had to transform the variables.
For the physical infrastructure variables, we take square root of electricity consumed per
capita, energy consumed per capita, telephone mainlines per 100 population, and internet
subscribers per 100 population to make the assumption of multivariate normality stronger.
We generate the completed datasets3 and check the fit of the model by looking at the com-
pare, overimpute and overdisperse graphs for all the variables (figures A.1, A.3 and A.5 in
appendix A).
For social infrastructure variables,4 we transform all the variables, except political
stability and absence of violence and terrorism, by taking square root, and generate the
completed datasets and check the fit of the model by looking at the compare, overimpute
and overdisperse graphs for all the variables (figures A.2, A.4 and A.6 in appendix A).
The compare density graph is a diagnostic check of the fit of the imputation model.
The density of the mean of the ‘m’ (m > 1) imputed datasets are overlaid on the density of
the observed values to compare the shape of the density of imputed values. Although it is
impossible to have a graph in which the two distributions are exactly identical, the closer
the two densities are to each other, the better is the imputation model and more reliable are
the imputed datasets. Imputations that generate very different densities of imputed values
as compared to the observed values indicate that the imputation model require some more
investigation and therefore some more improvement.
The overimpute graph is another way of checking the accuracy of the imputation model.
Assuming each observed value to be missing, we generate a large number of imputations for
each observation, as if they are missing such that we can construct a 90% confidence interval
for imputations of the actually observed values. We can then inspect whether the observed
values fall within the 90% confidence interval or not. We graph estimates of each (observed)
value against the true value of the observation. On this graph, y = x line is called the line
3Road density does not require imputation because there are no missing values in it.
4For both physical and social infrastructure variables, we first rescale the individual scores on a (0–1)
scale.
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of perfect agreement. If the imputation model is a perfect predictor of missing values, all
values will lie on the line of perfect agreement.
If the data supplied to the software ‘Amelia’ does not have a well-behaved likelihood,
the EM (expectation maximization) algorithm (which is deterministic) might not be able to
locate the global maxima (if the data has a multi-modal distribution). This graph ensures
that the algorithm’s ability to locate the global maxima is independent of the starting
values. It plots the convergence of the EM algorithm from various starting values to check
whether it is converging to the same point or not. In case of a well-behaved likelihood,
EM chains from different starting values will converge to the same value. The overdisperse
diagnostic plots the graph of the paths of each chain. By visual inspection, it can be checked
whether the chains converge to the same point or not.
The three diagnostic graphs for the physical and social infrastructure variables are
plotted in figures A.1–A.6 (in appendix A). In compare graphs for physical and social
infrastructure variables, figure A.1 and A.2, the distribution of mean imputations look very
similar to the observed values. The overimpute graphs, figures A.3 and A.4, suggest that
the imputed values fall in the 90% confidence interval. Figures A.5 and A.6 show that for
every single variable (physical as well as social infrastructure), the different EM chains (from
different starting values) converge to the same value. The three diagnostic tests suggest that
our imputation fit is suitable for further empirical analysis.
2.3 Principal component analysis
Principal component analysis is a statistical tool that summarizes the information
available in a multivariate system into a smaller dimension. Apart from the parsimonious
measure obtained, the coefficients obtained from the analysis shed some light on the im-
portance of each of the factors in the composite measure. Details of PCA techniques are
well known. Analyzing a dataset comprised of a large number of variables, we try to get a
more compact measure by exploiting the pattern of dependence among the variables. As
a measure of dependence among variables, we either use the variable correlation, or, the
covariance matrix. The correlation matrix is used when the variables are in very different
16
units; whereas the covariance matrix is used when all the variables are in comparable units.
PCA essentially determines the coefficient of all the variables in the composite measure by
maximizing the variation among the related variables (to extract maximum information
relating to dependence among the variables in the multivariate system), subject to the con-
straint that the sum of square of coefficients equals one. This maximization exercise solves
for the coefficients for all the variables that appear in the composite measure, subject to
the scaling constraint and the orthogonality constraint. The composite measure is then
obtained by linearly combining the values of the individual variables times the respective
coefficients obtained from the maximization problem. The ‘first’ principal component (PC
1) thus obtained, extracts (say) x% of the variation in the observed multivariate data. The
second principal component (PC 2) obtained from the same problem, gives us another set
of coefficients and we obtain our ‘second’ principal component in a similar manner. Owing
to the second constraint (the orthogonality constraint), our second principal component is
designed to explain the remainder of the variation, (100−x)%. So, if we proceed to extract-
ing all the components, the proportion of variation that is extracted by each of the principal
components add upto 100%. This is the significance of the orthogonality assumption in the
optimization problem. We attempt to construct an index of physical and social infrastruc-
ture by using this multivariate technique. A formal, mathematical analysis is included in
appendix A.2.
For the index of physical infrastructure, we gather information on road density, elec-
tricity consumption per capita, energy consumption per capita, telephone mainlines per
100 population and internet subscribers per 100 population (for description of physical
infrastructure variables, refer to table A.1 in the appendix) and using covariance matrix,
we carry out the analysis and come up with a composite score for physical infrastructure.
The dependence pattern, given by the sample covariance matrix (refer to tables 2.2 and
2.3 for physical and social infrastructure variable covariance matrix, respectively), gives us
coefficients for all the five factors. Similarly, for creating an index of social infrastructure,
we collect data on voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence and
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terrorism, rule of law, control of corruption, government effectiveness, and, regulatory qual-
ity (for description of social infrastructure variables, refer to table A.1 in the appendix).
These scores are obtained from the World Bank development report database and we apply
the PCA on the scores to generate a composite measure of social infrastructure. We then
combine the physical and social infrastructure indices, again using principal components,
to generate an index of socioeconomic infrastructure.
Table 2.2: Covariance matrix for physical infrastructure variables
elec energy inter road tele
elec 0.0223
energy 0.0141 0.0106
inter 0.0115 0.0064 0.0247
road 0.0026 0.0019 0.0042 0.0040
tele 0.0170 0.0089 0.0226 0.0070 0.0450
Table 2.3: Covariance matrix of social infrastructure variables
corrupt gov pol reg rule voice
corrupt 0.0303
gov 0.0257 0.0288
pol 0.0236 0.0206 0.0384
reg 0.0239 0.0267 0.0189 0.0309
rule 0.0264 0.0245 0.0263 0.0235 0.0294
voice 0.0247 0.0247 0.0276 0.0275 0.0262 0.0530
Principal component analysis applied to physical infrastructure variables generates fac-
tor loadings of 0.1230, 0.4178, 0.2472, 0.7241, 0.4742 for variables road density, electricity
consumption per capita, energy consumption per capita, telephone mainlines per 100 pop-
ulation, and internet subscribers per 100 population, respectively (refer to table 2.4 below);
for social infrastructure variables, factor loadings are 0.4805, 0.3984, 0.3990, 0.3934, 0.3838,
0.3863 for voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence and terrorism,
rule of law, control of corruption, government effectiveness, and regulatory quality respec-
tively. Using the factor loadings, we calculate the PII and SII, respectively. The PII and SII
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are then combined in a ratio (0.4847, 0.8747) to generate the index of socioeconomic infras-
tructure (SEI). The composite index obtained is then used to rank the 145 countries in our
subject list. We use sample covariance matrix for both physical and social infrastructure
variables to extract the eigenvalues (factor loadings) for all the factors.
Table 2.4: Factor loadings for physical as well as social infrastructure variables
Variable Factor loadings
Electricity per capita (elec) 0.4178
Energy per capita (energy) 0.2472
Internet per 100 (inter) 0.4742
Road density (road) 0.1230
Telephones per 100 (tele) 0.7241
Control of corruption (corrupt) 0.3934
Government effectiveness (gov) 0.3838
Political stability (pol) 0.3984
Rule of law (rule) 0.3990
Regulatory quality (reg) 0.3863
Voice and accountability (voice) 0.4805
For our measure of physical infrastructure, our first component, out of the five compo-
nents, could explain 69.33% of the total variation in the multivariate data. For our measure
of social infrastructure, the first component could explain 75.79%. Our measure for socio-
economic infrastructure is obtained by combining the physical and social infrastructure
indices according to the weights (0.4847, 0.8747), respectively, and the first component thus
obtained can explain 84.70% of the total variation.
Figure 2.1 shows the change in regional average for PI index over the years, 2000–
2008. All the regions have an upward sloping PI graph indicating a steady improvement
in physical infrastructure over the years.5 Figure 2.2, on the other hand, shows the change
in regional average for SI index over the same time period. An interesting point to note is
that the pattern of SI trend is very similar for developing countries. Except for Europe and
Central Asia, which shows a gradual increase after 2002, all the other regions experience a
5We follow World Bank’s method of classification of countries according to geographical regions they
belong to.
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somewhat downward trend. Sub-Saharan Africa exhibits a unique trend. After dipping to
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Fig. 2.1: PI index over the years
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Fig. 2.2: SI index over the years
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Table 2.5: Comparison of ranks of countries based on ‘computed’ PI, SI and SEI indices
Country PI rank SI rank SEI ranka
Afghanistan 140 141 141
Albania 70 72 74
Algeria 76 102 105
Angola 125 129 131
Antigua and Barbuda 5 10 5
Argentina 30 56 43
Armenia 46 68 62
Azerbaijan 50 107 97
Bahamas, The 7 3 2
Bahrain 4 28 15
Bangladesh 113 108 114
Barbados 3 1 1
Belarus 15 122 91
Belize 63 31 36
Benin 121 54 71
Bhutan 88 36 46
Bolivia 81 78 82
Bosnia and Herzegovina 29 71 51
Botswana 78 6 23
Brazil 33 38 31
Bulgaria 13 29 22
Burkina Faso 132 66 80
Burma/Myanmar 130 142 143
Burundi 134 131 134
Cambodia 141 105 113
Cameroon 123 109 115
Cape Verde 61 20 28
Central African Republic 142 133 136
Chad 143 130 132
Chile 25 2 3
China 37 88 69
Colombia 44 79 68
Comoros 103 111 116
Dem. Rep. of Congo 145 144 144
Rep. of Congo 122 128 129
Costa Rica 23 15 14
Cote d’ Ivoire 112 138 138
a Source: Author’s own calculation
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Table 2.6: Comparison of ranks of countries based on ‘computed’ PI, SI and SEI indices
Country PI rank SI rank SEI ranka
Cuba 71 110 110
Croatia 8 24 18
Djibouti 108 100 109
Dominica 17 7 11
Dominican Republic 64 57 55
Ecuador 60 99 93
Egypt 58 81 75
El Salvador 62 48 49
Equatorial Guinea 102 132 133
Eritrea 124 124 125
Ethiopia 136 115 119
Fiji 57 55 52
Gabon 95 77 87
Gambia 100 73 83
Georgia 55 86 77
Ghana 111 45 53
Grenada 21 16 20
Guatemala 75 85 86
Guinea 137 127 127
Guinea-Bissau 126 119 122
Guyana 53 61 54
Haiti 105 134 135
Honduras 80 80 81
Hungary 11 4 4
India 92 49 57
Indonesia 85 95 95
Iran 34 112 94
Iraq 94 143 142
Jamaica 41 42 40
Jordan 51 32 34
Kazakhstan 42 98 79
Kenya 106 97 104
Kiribati 90 30 39
North Korea 96 140 140
Kuwait 6 25 19
Kyrgyzstan 68 104 100
a Source: Author’s own calculation
With respect to SEI, Barbados, Bahamas, Chile, Hungary, and Antigua and Barbuda
rank among the top.6 The SEI score combines the physical infrastructure and the social
infrastructure score in a ratio (0.4847, 0.8747). With greater weight on social infrastructure
index score, the SEI score and therefore the SEI rank would appear to be closer to the SI
index rank.
6For detailed rankings on PI, SI and SEI, please refer to columns 2 and 3 in the same tables.
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Table 2.7: Comparison of ranks of countries based on ‘computed’ PI, SI and SEI indices
Country PI rank SI rank SEI ranka
Lao PDR 116 123 124
Latvia 12 14 9
Lebanon 40 84 73
Lesotho 107 51 65
Liberia 118 135 137
Libya 48 118 108
Lithuania 14 8 10
Macedonia, FYR 22 64 42
Madagascar 135 52 67
Malawi 131 76 90
Malaysia 19 23 24
Maldives 66 46 47
Mali 139 53 72
Mauritania 119 74 88
Mauritius 27 13 17
Mexico 38 41 38
Moldova 36 87 66
Mongolia 77 44 48
Morocco 74 59 59
Mozambique 128 65 78
Namibia 84 26 33
Nepal 117 103 111
Nicaragua 98 75 85
Niger 144 91 101
Nigeria 110 125 126
Oman 47 22 29
Pakistan 91 117 117
Panama 45 34 32
Papua New Guinea 114 90 99
Paraguay 79 101 102
Peru 65 62 60
Philippines 87 67 76
Qatar 2 21 8
Romania 35 37 30
Russia 16 93 61
Rwanda 133 106 112
a Source: Author’s own calculation
Countries such as Azerbaijan, Belarus, Qatar, Syria, Turkmenistan, and Venezuela (to
name a few) have a much better PI score compared to their SI score,7 as a result of which
7Azerbaijan has a fairly developed physical infrastructure with a relatively advanced transportation sys-
tem, being located on the crossroads of major international traffic arteries. However, its social infrastructure
score and rank are not at par with sound social infrastructure standards. The 2008 ‘Freedom in the World’
report (published by the Freedom House, a US based non-governmental organization that conducts research
and advocacy on democracy, political freedom and human rights) labeled Azerbaijan a ‘Not free’ country.
In spite of sound physical infrastructure facilities, government restrictions on freedom of speech and press,
peaceful assembly and religion remain in place in Belarus. It’s alleged to be ‘republic in name, although in
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Table 2.8: Comparison of ranks of countries based on ‘computed’ PI, SI and SEI indices
Country PI rank SI rank SEI ranka
St. Kitts and Nevis 9 11 7
St. Lucia 24 5 12
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 32 9 16
Samoa 73 17 27
Sao Tome and Principe 83 58 63
Saudi Arabia 28 69 50
Senegal 101 50 64
Seychelles 20 33 26
Sierra Leone 138 116 121
Solomon Islands 115 94 103
Somalia 129 145 145
South Africa 49 19 25
Sri Lanka 82 63 70
Suriname 43 39 37
Swaziland 93 92 96
Syria 52 113 107
Tajikistan 86 126 123
Tanzania 120 70 84
Thailand 54 40 41
Togo 104 120 120
Tonga 59 60 56
Trinidad and Tobago 10 27 21
Tunisia 56 43 44
Turkey 26 47 35
Turkmenistan 67 137 128
Uganda 127 96 106
Ukraine 31 83 58
United Arab Emirates (UAE) 1 18 6
Uruguay 18 12 13
Uzbekistan 72 136 130
Vanuatu 97 35 45
Venezuela 39 114 98
Vietnam 69 89 89
Yemen 99 121 118
Zambia 109 82 92
Zimbabwe 89 139 139
a Source: Author’s own calculation
their SEI score (and rank) is closer to their SI score compared to their PI score.
fact a dictatorship’ and is viewed as a rogue state by the US and European democracies-one whose conduct
is out of line with international norms of behavior and whose regime is considered to violate human rights.
Belarus has been called ‘the last true remaining dictatorship in the heart of Europe.’ This is well reflected in
the PI and SI ranks of Belarus. These two examples document the fact that a sound physical infrastructure
does not necessarily imply a sound social infrastructure and vice versa. They are two different aspects of a
country’s infrastructure and are combined in an approximately 1 : 3 ratio to obtain our measure of socioe-
conomic infrastructure. The relatively greater importance placed on socioeconomic index is reflected in the
SEI rank being relatively closer to the SI rank than the PI rank.
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A good socioeconomic infrastructure ranking is indicative of a good social overhead
capital as well as a sound administrative structure, which provides an efficient and com-
petitive business environment. A sound business environment not only facilitates domestic
ventures, but also encourages foreign enterprises to open facilities in these countries and
foreign enterprises are not only responsible for influx of foreign funds, but also, superior
technological know-how and better business practices. So, developing countries must devote
more resources in order to upgrade the country’s infrastructure.
2.4 Concluding comments
In this paper, we constructed an index of socioeconomic infrastructure for 145 countries,
using the multivariate technique of principal components. Principal component technique
is useful not only for providing a more parsimonious representation of multivariate data,
but also for extracting coefficient for each variable, signifying its relative importance in the
composite measure, by maximizing variation among the variables in the multivariate data.
There have been earlier attempts to compute various indices of infrastructure. Our study
differs from other studies in terms of the definition of infrastructure and also in the way
we treat the case of missing data, employing the statistical technique of multiple imputa-
tion. In construction of an index of physical infrastructure, we combine variables such as
road density, electricity consumption per capita, energy consumption per capita, telephone
mainlines per 100 population, internet subscribers per 100 population with eigen values
(0.1230, 0.4178, 0.2472, 0.7241, 0.4742). The most important factor in the composite index
is telecommunication facility and power consumption requirement per person followed by
transportation infrastructure. In construction of social infrastructure, we combine variables,
such as, voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence and terrorism,
rule of law, control of corruption, government effectiveness and regulatory quality with eigen
values (0.4805, 0.3984, 0.3990, 0.3934, 0.3838, 0.3863). The most important factors being
political stability and absence of violence and terrorism, rule of law, voice and account-
ability followed by regulatory quality, control of corruption and, government effectiveness.
To obtain our index of socioeconomic infrastructure, we combine PII and SII indices with
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eigen values (0.4847, 0.8747). Our created index of socioeconomic infrastructure is then
used to rank the 145 countries in our study. This index is further used in the next chapter
to study whether foreign aid crowds out foreign direct investment or not, socioeconomic
infrastructure being a determinant of foreign direct investment across developing countries.




FDI, Foreign Aid and Socioeconomic Infrastructure
3.1 Introduction
The literature on income transfer dates back to Keynes [48], where he argued that the
German reparation payments, after the World War I, had resulted in a decrease in its terms
of trade1, known as the orthodox view. Jones [49] took the literature to a new direction and
presented a number of cases, where, in absence of trade barriers, an income transfer could
result in an increase in the donor’s terms of trade and therefore pioneered an unorthodox,
and somewhat paradoxical view. His paper dealt more with presumption and bias about
the effects of the terms of trade of the transferring country than the actual effect. The
orthodox bias was that the terms of trade of the donor country deteriorates following a
transfer. Jones [49] set out to reverse the bias on the premise that “the real income loss
represented by the transfer at initial prices may be mitigated by the ‘secondary’ effects
of an improvement in the terms of trade.” The literature continues to this day and has
taken a number of different avenues. Jones [50] reconsidered the effect of income transfer
on terms of trade by assuming the existence of non traded goods. Jones [50] found that
the different degrees of demand and supply disparities between countries is a prominent
factor in determining the effects on a transferring country’s terms of trade. Also, price
sensitivity, both of demanders and producers, as a cause of trade, strongly impacts terms
of trade in a transfer where a non traded good is present. Brecher and Bhagwati [51],
Bhagwati et al. [52], and Srinivasan and Bhagwati [53] indicated the conditions under which
an income transfer could be immiserizing for the recipient country, thus establishing the
1In international trade terminology, terms of trade is defined as the relative price of exportables over
importables and is computed as the index of export prices over index of import prices. An improvement
(deterioration) in a country’s terms of trade therefore implies that the nation can exchange more (less)
number of exportables per unit of importables.
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welfare paradox. Brecher and Bhagwati [51] made a clear distinction between foreign and
national income in an economy where foreign ownership is present. When the national and
aggregate incomes differ, the recipient country experiences a decrease in national welfare,
which is contrary to the standard results. This immiserizing growth is also shown to occur
in stable markets. Bhagwati et al. [52] generalized these results by claiming that this
paradox (immiserizing growth to the recipient of the transfer) can only occur with market
stability if there are certain ‘distortions’ in the economy. They set up a three-agent model,
where two of the agents engage in bilateral transfer, and the third outside agent is included
in order to simulate a multilateral environment, to derive the conditions for immiserizing
transfer. Kemp and Kojima [54] and Schweinberger [55], among others, investigated welfare
paradox of an income transfer when such aid is tied.2 Kemp and Kojima [54] verified that
perverse outcomes occur in the presence of market stability when dealing with tied aid
on the part of the recipient or donor. Unlike previous literature establishing the welfare
paradox, their work is not reliant on an additional country or commodity. Schweinberger [55]
offered a slightly alternative model to Kemp and Kojima [54] where he claimed that tied
aid puts constraint on spending of the private sector’s income. A surprising result of his
model is that if aid is tied in the donor’s export market, the donor paradox (enrichment
to the donor) cannot occur. Beladi [56] reexamined the welfare effects of international
transfers in a two-country general equilibrium model of trade in the presence of generalized
unemployment. In this context he derived the necessary conditions for the occurrence of
paradoxical as well as normal results on employment and welfare. Lahiri and Raimondos [57]
considered the welfare effects of aid tied to quantitative trade restrictions. They found that
these quantitative distortions do not of themselves cause a transfer paradox because unlike
price distortions, quotas alone do not bring distortions into other markets. In the case
of quantitative trade restrictions, the transfer paradox occurs only with quota reform and
only as a result of the welfare changes associated with that reform. Lahiri and Raimondos-
Moller [58] investigated foreign aid tied to tariff reforms where they present conditions
2An aid is tied when the donor requires aid to be spend in a way not closely related to private preference
of the recipient.
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where Pareto-improvement occured for the recipient and donor countries as well as the
third outside country not involved in the transfer. By tying aid to changes in tariffs,
they showed that, theoretically, a certain level of welfare can be attained in the donor
country, while the tariff reduction will not cause the recipient country’s tariff revenue to
decrease. Hatzipanayotou and Michael [59] assumed that the recipient uses foreign aid to
finance a public consumption good, and they investigated the impact on terms of trade
of both the recipient and the donor. They also showed that the income transfer could be
welfare enriching for the donor and welfare immiserizing for the recipient. In addition to
this, they showed that a transfer can increase or decrease world welfare, thus improving
or worsening the welfare of both countries. Yano and Nugent [60] examined the impact of
development aid on the welfare of a small open economy in presence of non-traded goods
(as a significant amount of aid is spent on non-traded infrastructures) and demonstrated
that welfare paradox can take place. They claimed that expansion of non-traded sectors
can outweigh the benefits of aid and therefore could result in welfare paradox. However,
Choi [61] indicated that in a set up with two factors, two tradable goods, and a non-
traded good, the terms of trade for a small economy cannot deteriorate. Thus he claimed
that Yano and Nugent’s [60] condition on non-traded goods sector is not necessary. More
recently, Abe and Takarada [62] attempted to resolve some of the issues surrounding the
dispute between Kemp and Kojima [54] and Schweinberger [55]. Their model of tied aid
showed that when the households of the recipient country have knowledge of the transfers
and have the ability to trade the purchased goods, no transfer paradoxes occur in the context
of normal commodities. Kemp [63] extended the theory of tied aid by creating a model that
is compatible with non-tradable public consumption goods. He argued that with private
consumption goods, households can resell the aid on world markets, essentially ‘untying’
the aid. The transfer paradox, in this context, still exists. Torsvik [64] examined the
implications of donor cooperation and mutual aid policy. He showed that donor cooperation
is always beneficial when aid contracts are used. When contracts are not used, however,
cooperation can harm the donor countries involved in the transfer. Alesina and Dollar [65]
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studied the trends of foreign aid allocation. They found that political strategy plays a
role as significant as the economic needs of the recipient countries in determining who gets
what aid. Their study revealed that all other things constant, democratic countries are
granted more aid. And although politics strongly influences foreign aid allocation, the
underlying economic parameters in the recipient countries significantly stimulate foreign
direct investments.
Beladi and Oladi [42] raise an entirely different question: Does foreign aid crowd out
foreign investment when foreign aid is used by the recipient country to finance a public
consumption good? It is important to study if there is any conflict between these two
sources of foreign capital because, on one hand, foreign aid recipients are mostly capital-
constrained, developing countries dependent on foreign funds, on the other hand, these
countries also compete with other developing countries for foreign direct investment from
multinational investors.
Foreign direct investment is considered to be an important source of capital for de-
veloping nations. Impact of foreign investment on economic development of developing
economies is a well-documented, albeit controversial, issue. Microeconomic firm-level stud-
ies present no evidence in support of the view that FDI benefits developing host countries
through technology spillovers [7], or that, FDI accelerates economic growth [66–68]. How-
ever, macroeconomic studies, involving aggregate FDI flows, suggest that FDI flows stim-
ulate economic growth in developing countries. For example, Borenzstein et al. [69] argue
that FDI flows benefit developing countries with an educated workforce through significant
technology spillovers, whereas Blomstrom et al. [70] find no such evidence. However, they
argue that FDI inflow does have a growth effect on the relatively richer developing coun-
tries. Alfaro and others’ [71] study reveals that FDI inflows benefit developing countries
with sufficiently developed financial infrastructure, whereas Balasubramanyam et al. [72]
argue that trade openness is crucial for reaping benefits from FDI inflow. So, there is mixed
evidence of positive impact of FDI on economic growth of developing countries. Therefore,
it is imperative to investigate the question whether foreign aid crowds out foreign direct
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investment in developing countries or not. To address this issue, Beladi and Oladi [42] con-
sider a three-sector general equilibrium model with two tradable sectors (exportable and
import-competing, or, importable) and a non-traded public consumption good sector. Their
framework is closely related to Kemp [63], Jones [50], and Hatzipanayotou and Michael [59].3
As in Hatzipanayotou and Michael [59], they assume that the recipient country uses foreign
aid to finance the production of the public consumption good and that foreign investment
takes place in the exportable sector. Their analysis shows that such foreign aid impedes
foreign investment if importable sector is relatively more capital intensive compared to the
public good sector. The reason is quite intuitive. An increase in foreign aid draws resources
(labor and capital) from the import-competing sector. If the capital intensity of importable
sector is higher compared to the public sector, for every unit of importable that is not
produced, capital released is more than required by the public sector, whereas, labor re-
leased is less than what is required by the latter, which implies that some labor requirement
remains unfulfilled. This extra labor is drawn from the exportable sector, which reduces
the marginal product of foreign capital, which in turn reduces foreign investment. There
might be a trade-off between foreign aid and foreign investment that policy makers should
be aware of. In a similar set-up, we try to theoretically analyze the effect of foreign aid
on foreign direct investment, when foreign aid is used to finance production of a public
intermediate good. Our theory (developed in the next section) suggests that such type of
aid always encourages foreign direct investment, however, the degree of crowding-in effect
depends upon the relative factor-intensity of the sectors. The empirical section of the paper
attempts to validate this proposition.4
Complementarity or substitutability between foreign aid and foreign direct investment
has been a controversial issue in the literature on foreign aid. Empirical literature on
the relationship between foreign aid and foreign private investment, still relatively less
extensive compared to other issues of international finance, presents a far from complete
picture. No robust relationship between aid and FDI has been reported so far. On one
3See also Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro [73].
4The empirical section attempts to address the same issue, although along different lines.
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hand, Blaise [74] reports a positive relationship between aid to infrastructure and foreign
direct investment; Bhavan et al. [75] conduct a study on South Asian countries and report
that ‘both aid in the shape of physical capital and aid for human capital and infrastructure
development serve as complementary factors to foreign direct investment rather than being
substitutable in South Asian economies’; on the other hand, Karakaplan et al. [76] find a
negative relationship between the same, whereas Kimura and Todo [77] find no significant
effect of infrastructure on FDI. A common feature of all the studies so far is a lack of
any theoretical explanation to support its empirical framework. The theoretical paper by
Beladi and Oladi [42] bridges that gap in the literature by providing a three-sector general
equilibrium model to propose a theory that complementarity or substitutability of foreign
aid and foreign direct investment is contingent upon the composition, or, nature of aid. The
theory is elaborated in the next section. Lack of robustness of the empirical findings may
be attributed to the manner in which foreign aid is defined in various studies. Karakaplan
et al. [76] use data on Official Development Assistance as a measure of aid. Harms and
Lutz [78] differentiate between grants, technical cooperation grants, as well as bilateral
and multilateral aid, whereas Kimura and Todo [77] use an aggregate aid to infrastructure
projects and non-infrastructure related aid, an approach very similar to ours.
A paper that deserves special mention is ‘Does Foreign Aid Increase Foreign Direct
Investment?’ by Selaya and Sunesen [79]. They approach the very same issue that we
are addressing in this paper, however, from an entirely different direction. They consider
disaggregated data for a sample of 99 countries, averaged over five-year intervals during
1977–2001. They model net inflows of FDI as a function of the two different types of
aid, aid to complementary inputs and aid to physical capital, and other explanatory fac-
tors, such as, savings per capita, population growth, lagged FDI, and GDP per capita.
Their estimation technique also differs from ours; considering the possibility of endogene-
ity among variables, they employ GMM estimation technique. They consider two different
types of aid, aid in complementary inputs, defined as ‘aid oriented to social infrastructure
(such as education, health, and water supply projects) and economic infrastructure (such as
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energy, transportation, and communications projects)’ and aid in physical inputs, defined
as ‘contributions to directly productive sectors (such as agriculture, manufacturing, trade,
banking, and tourism projects)’ [79]. We define our aid variables in a similar manner, call-
ing it ‘development’ and ‘public consumption’ aid, respectively. However, in our regression
equation, we control for the determinants of FDI across developing countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present our theoretical model in the
next section. Section 3.3 describes the data and elaborates on the empirical model used in
the study. Section 3.4 reports the results obtained and discusses the policy implications,
whereas section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The theory
Consider a small, open recipient economy that produces two tradable final goods, an
exportable (E), an import-competing good (or, importable, M), and, a non-traded public
intermediate good (I). The production function for the exportable good is given by Xe =
fe(Ke, Ie), where, Xe is the quantity of exportable good produced, Ke is the foreign capital
used in the exportable sector, and Ie denotes the quantity of public input used in this
sector. The production technology for the import-competing sector is represented by the
production function Xm = fm(Km, Im), where, Xm, Km, and Im denote the quantities of
production of import-competing good, the domestic capital usage, and the public input used
by the sector, respectively. We assume that foreign capital is only used by the exportable
sector. This assumption is consistent with the observation that multinational corporations
are responsible for most of the foreign direct investments, which is targeted towards exports.
The public input is supplied to the other sectors free of charge by the government. One
could think of such public inputs as infrastructures such as public education, roads etc.
The production function for the public input is given by I = fi(Ki), where, I and Ki are
the production of public input and the domestic capital used by the public input sector,
respectively. We assume that the government finances the production of this intermediate
good through foreign aid.5 Finally, we assume all the neoclassical assumptions regarding the
5The amount of foreign aid therefore acts as an effective budget constraint for the government.
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above production functions, which exhibit constant returns to scale as well as diminishing
marginal productivity. Assuming that the markets for the tradable sectors are perfectly
competitive, we have the following zero profit equilibrium conditions:
aKerf = pe (3.1)
aKmr = pm (3.2)
where, aKj and pj , j = e,m are the unit capital requirements and the unit prices in sectors E
and M , rf and r denote the returns to foreign capital and domestic capital, respectively. It
is further assumed that the return to foreign capital (rf ) and the prices of import-competing
and exportable goods (pm and pe, respectively) are determined in the international market
and therefore they are fixed for the recipient economy. This is due to the small economy
assumption and is consistent with the fact that recipients of foreign aid are often small,
developing economies. We also assume the initial final good prices are equal to unity. Since
the production of public intermediate good is financed by foreign aid, we have the following
equilibrium condition for our public input sector:
aKirI = T (3.3)
where, aKi is the optimal unit capital requirement and T denotes the level of foreign aid.
The left hand side of equation (3.3) is the cost of public input. The resource constraints,
given full employment of all factors, are given by the following equations:
aKeXe = Ke (3.4)
aKmXm + aKiI = K (3.5)
aIeXe + aImXm = I (3.6)
where, K is the fixed endowment of domestic capital, aIe and aIm are the per unit public
input requirements in export and import-competing sector respectively. Equation (3.4)
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implies the factor specificity6 of foreign capital. Equation (3.5) states that the domestic
capital is mobile across the import-competing and the public input sectors. Equation (3.6)
indicates that the public input is mobile between the two tradable final good sectors. Finally,
note that the equation (3.1) is redundant as it could be replaced into equation (3.4). Thus,
equations (3.2)-(3.6) constitute a system with five equations and five endogenous variables,
Xe,Xm,I,r, and Ke. Our model is a fairly simple general equilibrium model that allows us,
with relative ease, to analyze the problem and answer the question that was raised in this
paper. This system can also be easily solved piecewise. Equation (3.2) gives us a unique
value for r. Using the equilibrium value of r in equation (3.3), we find the equilibrium value
of I and then use equation (3.5) to find the value of Xm. Equation (3.6), in turn, could
be used to find the value of Xe. Finally, we solve equation (3.4) for the equilibrium value
of Ke. Replacing equation (3.2) into equation (3.3), and then substituting the resulting
equation as well as equations, (3.4) and (3.5), into equation (3.6), the following is obtained
























where, a circumflex (xˆ) denotes a proportional change in variable x, λIe is the exportable
sector share of input I and km is the capital-public input ratio in the import-competing
sector.8 Moreover, in obtaining equation (3.8), we assume rˆf = rˆ = aˆij = 0, where rf and r
are the return to foreign and domestic capital respectively, and aij is the unit requirement
of ith factor in jth sector, i = K, I and j = E,M, I, due to constant factor prices and fixed
coefficient technology. Equation (3.8) is then used to conclude the following proposition
6The factor Ke, or, foreign capital, is used only in production of exportables, which makes Ke ‘specific’
to export sector.









which formally addresses the research question.
Proposition 1. Let foreign aid (denoted by T ) be used by the recipient country in financing
a public input (denoted by I). Such foreign aid encourages foreign direct investment (denoted
by Ke).
This proposition has a great policy recommendation. Foreign aid may be used to
finance public inputs, such as, social overhead capital, public education. Such aid will induce
inflow of foreign direct investment. This important result complement the result obtained
by Beladi and Oladi [42], where they show that foreign aid if used in financing public
consumption goods could discourage foreign direct investment. Equation (3.8) reveals some
other interesting relationships. The more capital intensive9 the import-competing sector is,
the less the positive impact of such type of foreign aid on the inflow of foreign capital will







Higher km is, lower will be
aKi
km





implies, that Tˆ will have a lower impact on Kˆe. This is somewhat intuitive. An increase
in foreign aid leads to an increase in production of the public input (from equation (3.3)).
This could only be possible if domestic capital moves from the import-competing sector to
the public sector. The more capital intensive the import-competing sector is, the less public
input it releases to the exportable sector when domestic capital leaves the importable sec-
tor.10 Moreover, equation (3.8) indicates that higher the public input share of the exportable
sector is, lesser the impact of such type of foreign aid on the foreign direct investment.
9Capital intensity of the two-factor (K, I) import-competing sector is defined as the amount of capital




10When foreign aid enters, production of public input rises due to resources (K, I) released by the





is higher than KI , import-
competing sector releases less public input to exportable sector, when domestic capital moves from import-
competing to public sector. This implies less increase in productivity of foreign capital resulting in less influx
of foreign direct investment into the country.
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In the next section, we go on to empirically test the proposition, using data on devel-
oping countries.
3.3 Data & methodology
Beladi and Oladi [42] study the relationship between foreign aid and foreign direct
investment in a three-sector general equilibrium model, where they show that foreign aid, if
used to finance public consumption, foreign capital being specific to export sector, crowds
out (in) foreign direct investment, if public sector is more (less) labor intensive than the
import-competing sector. The theory developed in the previous section considers foreign
aid in a similar set-up, financing public input, such as, roads, infrastructure, which in turn,
is used as input in the production of goods across the other two sectors. Such public input
or, public (development) aid encourages foreign direct investment, however, the magnitude
of positive effect depends upon the relative factor intensities of the public and the import-
competing sector. In this section, we test the hypothesis that aid directed towards funding
development projects crowds in foreign direct investment. Also, we try to empirically in-
vestigate the effect of a public consumption aid on foreign direct investment. We consider
a group of 154 developing countries (listed as developing countries by the International
Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook report [80]). We delete countries that have no
data for any of the key variables in our model during 2002–200811 and eventually end up
with 119 countries12.
We propose the following econometric framework capturing the influence of foreign aid
on foreign direct investment,
FDIit = α0 + α1DEV AIDit + α2CONSAIDit +XitAi + it (3.10)
The parameters, α1 and α2, capture the effect of development aid and consumption aid on
foreign direct investment, respectively. Matrix Xit contains control variables for FDI, such
11We were restricted to 2008 because some key variables did not have any data post 2008.
12The list of 119 developing countries used in this study is presented in tables D.1 and D.2 in the
appendix.
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as gross domestic product, growth rate of GDP, trade openness indicator, rate of inflation,
socio-economic infrastructure index, education index, current account balance, and tariff
rate (for description of variables, refer to tables B.1 and B.2 in the appendix). Taking into
consideration the variables that affect the flow of FDI, we attempt to check if foreign aid
has any impact on the flow of foreign direct investment across developing countries. Before
we develop the model further, let us first analyze the variables.
World Bank defines foreign direct investment (net inflows) as net inflows of investment
made to acquire a lasting management interest (10% or more of voting stock) in the recipient
economy, calculated as the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings along with other
long-term and short-term capital as shown in the country’s balance of payments. The
term ‘net’ signifies new investment inflows (less disinvestment) in the economy from foreign
investors. In our model, we use annual data on net inflow of FDI to recipient developing
economies in order to demonstrate the effect of incoming aid on the inflow of foreign direct
investment for these developing countries.
The standard definition of foreign aid (or, foreign assistance) comes from the Devel-
opment Assistance Committee (DAC) under the Organization of Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD), where, foreign aid is defined as financial flows, technical assis-
tance, and commodities that are designed to promote economic development and welfare
for emerging economies (excluding aid for military or other non-development purposes),
provided as either grants or subsidized loans. Grants and subsidized loans are referred to as
concessional financing, whereas loans that carry market or near-market terms (and therefore
are not foreign aid) are categorized as non-concessional financing. According to the DAC,
a loan counts as aid if it has a grant element of 25% or more, meaning that the present
value of the loan must be at least 25% below the present value of a comparable loan at
market interest rates (usually assumed by the DAC, rather arbitrarily, to be 10% with no
grace period). Thus, the grant element is zero for a loan carrying 10% interest rate, 100%
for outright grant, and something in-between 10% and 100% for other loans.
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The DAC classifies aid flows into three broad categories-(1) Official development assis-
tance (ODA), consisting of aid provided by donor governments to low and middle income
countries; (2) Official assistance (OA), aid provided by governments to richer countries with
per capita incomes higher than approximately $9, 000 (e.g., Bahamas, Cyprus, Israel, and
Singapore) and to countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union or its satellites,
and (3) Private voluntary assistance, which includes grants from non-government organiza-
tions, religious groups, charities, foundations, and private companies. For our purpose, we
consider gross disbursement of ODA from all registered donors to the recipient developing
countries, measured in current prices (US$ millions).
For compiling development and public consumption aid data, we use aid figures from
the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) database.13 The
source reports aid received by each developing country from donors including 23 member
nations of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, EU (European Union) institu-
tions and other international organizations and private donors, in seven broad categories;
(1) social infrastructure and services, (2) economic infrastructure and services, (3) produc-
tion sectors, (4) multi-sector/cross-cutting, (5) commodity aid/general program assistance,
(6) action relating to debt, and (7) humanitarian aid. We analyze each category and aggre-
gate total aid received for public consumption under different categories and call it “public
consumption aid”, and then subtract the public consumption and other unspecified aid from
total aid to call it “development aid”. Public consumption aid consists of aid received as
“humanitarian” aid (comprising of aid towards (i) emergency response, (ii) reconstruction
relief & rehabilitation, and (iii) disaster prevention and preparedness), “commodity assis-
tance” aid (comprising of aid directed towards (i) general budget support, (ii) food security
assistance, and (iii) other commodity assistance), “water” aid (comprising of aid utilized
for (i) water supply and sanitation-large systems, (ii) basic drinking water supply and basic
sanitation, (iii) waste management and disposal), “social infrastructure” aid (comprising of
aid towards (i) low cost housing, (ii) narcotics control, and (iii) prevention of HIV/AIDS),
“population policy” aid (comprising of aid towards (i) reproductive health care, (ii) family
13OECD database: http://stats.oecd.org/
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planning, and (iii) STD control including HIV/AIDS), and “health” aid (consisting of (i)
basic health care, (ii) basic nutrition, (iii) infectious disease control, (iv) malaria control and
(v) tuberculosis control). From total aid received from all donors, we subtract (i) “public
consumption” aid, aid towards (ii) administrative cost of donors, (iii) refugees in donor
countries, and (iv) unallocated and unspecified aid, to obtain “development aid”. Each of
the components of aid can be obtained from the OECD database.
FDI determinants can be classified into “pull” or “push” factors [81]. The terms “push”
and “pull” factors date back to the pioneering work of Ravenstein [82] who, analyzing census
data belonging to the populations of the Kingdoms of England and Wales, Scotland, and
Ireland since the 1840s, proposed a series of seven laws of migration of workers, in response
to Farr’s remark “that migration appeared to go on without any definite law”. Following
Ravenstein [82], Lee [81] proposed four factors; (1) push factors (conditions prevailing at the
origin), (2) pull factors (conditions prevailing at the destination), (3) intervening obstacles
and (4) personal factors, to explain migration of labor. In the context of migration of
capital, “pull” factors describe the economic conditions in the domestic country that affect
the inflow of foreign capital into its borders, whereas the “push” factors are the conditions
prevailing in the donor countries, or, in the world market. Our control vector contains
“pull” variables such as gross domestic product (GDP), growth rate of GDP (GRGDP),
trade openness indicator (TOI), rate of inflation (INF), socio-economic infrastructure index
(SEI), education index (EDU), current account balance (CABAL) and tariff rate (TARIFF).
These variables have been documented in the literature of determinants of foreign direct
investment as referred to in the next few paragraphs.
Gross domestic product represents the market size of an economy. Greater market size
may generate more profitable business for an enterprise. As documented by Tsai [16], the
proponents of market size hypothesis [83, 84] suggest that a large market ensures efficient
utilization of resources and exploitation of economies of scale. As market size grows to a
critical value, FDI starts increasing in response to increase in market size. Foreign investors,
while making investment decision overseas, look for greater business prospects to realize
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greater sale of goods and services and therefore higher export earnings or profit repatriation,
so, we expect market size to be a significant factor in foreign investment decisions by
foreign entrepreneurs. Similar evidence has been reported by Wang and Swain [85] and
Jaumotte [86]. However, Asiedu [87] finds no significant impact of market size on FDI.
Apart from the market size, the rate at which the market grows might be an important
factor for foreign entrepreneurs. Growth rate of GDP (GRGDP) signifies the rate of growth
of the market size of an economy. Growth rate hypothesis [88] predicts a positive relationship
between growth rate of GDP and FDI. An emerging market is relatively a more attractive
destination for foreign investors compared to an economy with sluggish, unsteady growth
rate. We therefore expect GRGDP to be positive and significant. However, Tsai [16] does
find an insignificant relationship between growth rate and FDI inflows.
Foreign investment is also affected by the country’s macroeconomic stability which is
represented by the rate of inflation (INF). High inflation manifests itself through reduced
return to investment thereby making investment appear less lucrative. It also distorts price
signals by tampering with the allocation of factors of production between tradable and
non-tradable sectors. Also, a highly volatile inflation rate may be indicative of a weak
monetary authority that fails at its job of maintaining economic buoyancy, viability, and
macroeconomic stability. It is therefore expected to negatively affect the inflow of foreign
direct investment. Inflation, here, is measured as an annual percentage change in average
yearly consumer price index.
Trade openness indicator (TOI) reflects how open an economy is to international trade
and is measured as the ratio of sum of exports and imports over yearly GDP. Higher TOI
indicates greater dependence of domestic economy on foreign transactions of goods and
services, which serves as a positive signal for foreign investors to invest in the country.
Another variable that signifies the country’s willingness to engage in foreign trade is
the tariff rate.14 Tariff is a tax, or, duty levied on a commodity when it crosses national
14Simple mean applied tariff is the unweighted average of effectively applied rates for all products subject
to tariffs calculated for all traded goods. Effectively applied tariff rates are averaged for products in each
commodity group. When the effectively applied rate is unavailable, the most favored nation rate is used
instead.
42
boundary. Import tariff is imposed by countries aiming at raising import revenue for its
government and discouraging exports from other countries into its boundary. A high tariff
barrier provides a disincentive to its trading partners and sends a negative signal to foreign
investors. Thus, we expect tariff rate to have a negative influence on inflow of foreign direct
investment.
Apart from macroeconomic stability, another variable that might affect inflow of foreign
funds is the country’s socioeconomic infrastructure index. This created index (refer to
chapter 1 for details) captures the nation’s social overhead capital as well as its business
climate which positively affects the foreign investors’ decision to invest in the country. This
might be an important factor for mobilizing foreign funds across nations.
Our socioeconomic infrastructure index is a new variable used in the regression for
inflow of FDI, many studies have alternatively considered political instability, risk or, cor-
ruption as a major deterrent for foreign investment. Wei [89] utilizes three different measures
of corruption compiled by Business International (BI), International Country Risk Group
(ICRG), and Transparency International (TI) to establish the negative effect of corruption
on investment decisions of foreign entrepreneurs.
Current account balance is defined as the sum of the balance on goods and services
plus the balance on unilateral transfers. A current account surplus represents an increase
in the net foreign wealth, whereas current account deficit is tantamount to an increase in
international indebtedness of the reporting country. A positive current account balance not
only indicates a sound macroeconomic health, but also projects the economy in good light
in terms of credibility in the international market, thus encouraging the influx of foreign
funds. Trade deficit has been reported as an important determinant of FDI. Trade surplus
economies are considered macroeconomically healthy and therefore might be an attractive
destination [84]. Many other researchers have reported similar results [23,25,26,90], whereas
[16, 21, 27] report a positive and statistically significant relationship between trade deficit
and FDI.
Quality of labor force is another factor that may be responsible for allocation of capital
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across the world. It can be proxied by the the wage rate of workers in a country, or their
skill level. Education index, constructed by the World Bank, is a linear combination of
adult literacy rate and gross enrollment ratio, in the ratio (23 ,
1
3), the ratio determined by
the principal component analysis technique. Though not a very good proxy for the index of
skill level of workers, we use it in our empirical model, expecting it to influence positively
the inflow of foreign direct investment. Many empirical researchers prefer to use wage rate
as a proxy for labor cost, but we could not gather enough data to include that variable in
our model. These are standard variables that have been documented in the determinants
of foreign direct investment literature (as cited earlier).15
The dataset was riddled with missingness (see table 3.1) and before we could do any
kind of data analysis, we had to multiply impute the data.
Table 3.1: Missingness pattern in variables
Variable Proportion of missingness (%)
Public consumption aid (CONSAID) 1.92
Development aid (DEVAID) 1.68
Current account balance (CABAL) 0
Gross domestic product (GDP) 0
Growth rate of GDP (GRGDP) 0.12
Trade openness indicator (TOI) 0
Foreign direct investment (FDI) 0.48
Gross domestic product, per capita (PCGDP) 0.36
Socioeconomic infrastructure (SEI) 0
Inflation (INF) 0.12
Education index (EDU) 16.09
Population (POP) 0.36
Working population (WORKPOP) 0
Tariff rate (TAR) 35.29
Government revenue (GOVREV) 0
Multiple imputation is a Monte Carlo approach to analysis of incomplete data, de-
scribed by Rubin [38] in the context of nonresponse in sample surveys. However, it is
general enough to be used for non-survey data as well. It is essentially nothing but solving
an incomplete data problem by repeatedly solving the complete data version and generating





(m). Each of the ‘m’ datasets are then analyzed by
complete data econometric techniques and the ‘m’ results are then combined using Rubin’s
formula [38]. The variability in the ‘m’ results serves as a measure of uncertainty due to
missing data, which combined with sample variation, provides us with an estimate and
variance of the parameters of interest16. The diagnostic graphs for checking the fit of the
imputation model are presented in figures B.1-B.5 at the end of the chapter.
Compare graph (refer to figure B.1) plots the distributions of observed values and
imputed values in a single graph for each variable to allow visual inspection of the fit of the
imputation model. For a good imputation model, the distribution of imputed values should
be as similar as possible to the distribution of observed values. This graph can be used
to check that the mean imputation falls within known bounds, when such bounds exist for
certain variables, in certain settings. Figure B.1 presents the compare graphs for variables
AGAID, DEV AID, FDI, PCGDP , EDU , POP , and TARIFF respectively.
Overimpute graph (refer to figures B.2 and B.3) checks the accuracy of the fit of the
imputation model by generating several imputations for each of the observed values and
creating a 95% confidence interval for each, treating the observed values as missing. The
imputed values are then plotted against the observed value to visually verify if the mean
imputed values are close to the observed values or not. Line y = x is the line of perfect
agreement and for a good imputation model, most of the mean imputed values should lie
close to the line y = x. By checking how many confidence intervals cover the y = x line, we
can predict how accurate the imputation model is in predicting the missing values.
Overdisperse graphs are presented in figures B.4 and B.5. If the data to be imputed
has a poorly behaved likelihood, the expectation maximization (EM) algorithm might have
problems in finding the global maxima of the likelihood function, specially when it has more
than one mode. To make sure that our imputations do not depend on a starting value, a
good check is to run the EM algorithm from multiple dispersed starting values and to check
their convergence. In a well-behaved likelihood, all the chains converge to the same value
indicating that point to be the global maximum.
16For detailed technical discussion of multiple imputation technique, please refer to chapter 1.
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This is one of the contributions of this empirical exercise. Multiple imputation helps
avoid dropping off subjects with missing information for any of the variables from the
analysis to avoid reducing the size of the dataset that may cause bias in results due to the
sample being unrepresentative.
Having defined our variables, we go on to estimating the following empirical model:
FDIit = α0i + α1CONSAIDit + α2DEV AIDit + α3GDPit + α4GRGDPit + α5INFit
+ α6TOIit + α7INFit × TOIit + α8SEIit + α9EDUit
+ α10CABALit + α11GRGDP × INF + α12TARIFFit + it
(3.11)
where, FDIit is the net inflow of foreign investment into a country (‘i’ represents cross-
section and ‘t’ the time period), CONSAIDit is the foreign aid that finances public con-
sumption, DEV AIDit is the foreign aid that finances development projects, GDPit is the
gross domestic product, GRGDPit is the growth rate of GDP , INFit is the rate of infla-
tion, TOIit is the trade openness indicator, computed as the sum of exports and imports
over gross domestic product as a measure for the degree of integration with the rest of the
world, SEIit is the index of socioeconomic infrastructure, EDUit is the education index
computed by the World Bank by combining gross enrollment ratio and adult literacy rate,
CABALit is the current account balance and TARIFFit is the tariff rate. Apart from the
variables, we include two interaction terms, INF × TOI and GRGDP × INF . The three
variables (INF , TOI, and GRGDP ) interact with each other and therefore each of these
three variables has a direct as well as indirect effect on the net inflow of FDI.
∂E(FDIit)
∂TOIit
= α6 + α7INFit (3.12)
∂E(FDIit)
∂GRGDPit
= α4 + α11INFit (3.13)
∂E(FDIit)
∂INFit
= α5 + α11GRGDPit + α7TOIit (3.14)
The effect of TOI on FDI is dependent on INF ; α6 and α7 are positive which implies that
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higher the inflation, more influx of FDI will occur if the economy opens up to international
trade. So, for developing countries plagued with high inflation rate, it pays to open up the
economy to world competition as competition drives operational efficiency and provides a
positive signal to foreign investors.
According to equation (3.13), effect of growth rate of GRGDP on FDI is not inde-
pendent of INF ; α4 is positive while α11 is negative, which implies that at higher levels of
inflation, the positive (partial) effect of GRGDP on FDI inflow (captured by α4) is out-
weighed by the negative coefficient of INF (α11) and, for low levels of inflation, emerging
economies attract more FDI. Therefore, we can say that inflation may be a more important
parameter to consider, for foreign investors, compared to the growth rate of GDP .
As per equation (3.14), effect of INF on FDI is dependent on GRGDP and TOI; α5
and α11 are negative while α7 is positive. For a country in a near-autarkic situation (very
low TOI), a higher growth rate may not neutralize the negative effect of INF on E(FDI).
If the economy is substantially active in the world market, the positive effect of a higher
TOI on E(FDI) may outweigh the negative effect of INF on the same.
Heterogeneity among cross-sectional units can be captured in two ways. One way is
to allow the intercept to vary for each cross-sectional unit and/or time period (α and ν),
assuming the slope coefficients (β) to remain constant across units. In literature, this model
is known as the covariance model or, the fixed effects model (FEM) and was first proposed
by Mundlak [91] and Wallace and Hussain [92]. The term “fixed effects” implies that the
cross-section specific component of the equation, that varies across units, remain constant
over time, i.e., it is time-invariant.17 The intercept term(s) specifically captures the cross-
section and/or time-specific heterogeneity among the subjects. Another way to capture the
unobserved heterogeneity is to include the cross-section specific term and/or the time period
specific term in the equation disturbance. This model, known as the error component model
or, the random effects model (REM), was advocated by Balestra and Nerlove [93]. Instead
of treating the subject-specific component as fixed, we assume it to be a random variable.
In other words, REM basically implies that the ‘n’ cross-sections included in our model
17The fixed effect cross-section coefficient is not correlated with the equation error term.
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are drawn from a much larger universe and they have a common mean for the intercept
and the individual’s difference from each other is reflected in the error term. Presence of
heterogeneity is tested by a poolability test18 that tests the null hypothesis of a pooled
model against a cross-section/time effect specific model and also additionally tests for a
one-way (only cross-section effect) versus a two-way (cross-section and time effect) model.
Random effects estimators save a number of degrees of freedom since the only un-
known parameter is the variance of the cross-sectional characteristic and is thus capable of
obtaining more efficient estimates of the regression parameters. The only problem is that
if the cross-sectional characteristic is correlated with the included explanatory variables,
the estimates will be biased and consistent. The advantage of covariance model is that it
protects us against a specification error caused by such a correlation, but the disadvantage
of fixed effects estimators is the loss of efficiency due to increased number of parameters
to be estimated. Therefore, the crucial factor for consideration is the correlation between
the cross-sectional characteristic and included explanatory variables, which is the basis of
Hausman [95] test (documented by Baltagi [96]) which tests a null hypothesis that no cor-
relation exists between the cross-sectional characteristic included in the error term and the
explanatory variables against the alternative that such a correlation exists. Under the null
hypothesis of E(X ′) = 0, the generalized least square estimator, β of the error component
(random effect) model is not very different from the least square estimator, β of the co-
variance (fixed effect) model. If the null hypothesis is true, the random effect estimator is
consistent and efficient. However, under the alternative hypothesis, i.e., E(X ′) 6= 0, the
fixed effect estimator is consistent and efficient. Therefore, if H0 is rejected in favor of HA,
fixed effect estimator technique is used.
3.4 Results and policy discussion
Owing to missing data, we first multiply impute the incomplete dataset to generate
18Whether a cross-sectional characteristic, α0i or, a time characteristic, v1t should be included in the
regression or not can be determined by an F-test comparing the restricted sum of squares (when α0i = v1t =
0) and the unrestricted sum of squares (α0i 6= 0, v1t 6= 0). Breusch-Pagan [94] LM test is conducted for an
error component (random effect) model to test for the presence of specific cross-sectional and/or time-related
effects in a three-component error term.
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five complete datasets. We then apply complete data estimation technique to individually
analyze each of the imputed datasets and combine the ‘m’ results using Rubin’s formula
[38].19 We first check for the presence of heterogeneous effect in our subjects by poolability
test.20 We do find evidence of a cross-section effect, but none for time effect.21 Hausman [95]
test suggests the use of fixed effects over random effects model.22 The estimation results23
are tabulated in table 3.2.
In model (1), we do not find evidence for crowding in or crowding out of foreign aid
(neither public consumption aid, nor, development aid) on foreign direct investment. Apart
from the intercept term (which is significant at 5% level), the GDP and CABAL are statis-
tically significant at 0.1% level. Market size is an important determinant of foreign direct
investment and this variable has been found to be positively and significantly affecting the
flows of foreign funds. Current account balance is the net revenue earned (earnings less of
expenditures) from sale of goods, services and income transfers. A high current account
balance implies that the country is a net exporter in the world market, which might be a
positive factor in influencing the flow of foreign direct investment. SEI is positive and sta-
tistically significant at 5% level. Socioeconomic infrastructure reflects the country’s social
overhead capital, on one hand, and the legal, political, and administrative machineries on
the other hand. It captures the business environment in a country, which is an instrumental
factor for driving foreign capital into less developed economies. Developing countries are
intrinsically capital constrained and theoretically it is known that the marginal productivity
of capital is higher in less capital abundant pockets of the world, so foreign capital seeking
high returns, will naturally be attracted to these areas. But, this does not happen, i.e., cap-
19The Rubin’s formula [38] is discussed in details in appendix A.1.
20This is an F-test conducted to test for presence of cross-section or time-specific intercept in the
regression equation.
21The average computed F-statistic for ‘pooling vs. within’ test is 3.9080 ∼ F(118,702). The average
computed F-statistic for ‘1-way vs. 2-way’ test is 0.9254 ∼ F(6,696), both of which are significant at 1%.
22The average Hausman test statistic is 31.6136 ∼ χ2(12) is significant at 1%.
23We have not conducted an endogeneity test between aid variables and FDI, because we consider aid
to be more or less an exogenous variable for our question at hand. Aid is a political variable, determined by
the government (or, public agents) of donor countries, determined by factors such as the recipient’s social
or economic conditions, whereas, FDI is a decision made by private firms on the basis of profitability of
investment. For instance, US government may decide to provide aid to Israel, but US firms may not be
willing to invest in Israel.
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ital does not flow from the richer to the poorer pockets of the world. One reason maybe that
these developing countries typically suffer from poor physical productive capacity; proper,
transparent legal, political and administrative policies to ensure corruption-free business
climate. A sound infrastructure may therefore be an important ingredient in allocating
FDI across developing nations. According to our estimates, socioeconomic infrastructure is
significant at 5% level of significance.
Tariff is negative and significant at 10% level, which is pretty intuitive. Tariff barriers
prevent countries from participating in international trade and a near-autarkic economy is
not a favorable destination for foreign investors, and therefore acts as deterrent to influx
of foreign funds. A very interesting feature of this model is the presence of interaction
terms. INF × TOI is significant at 5%, whereas INF × GRGDP is significant at 10%.
The statistical significance of these interaction terms suggest that in this set of countries,
inflation, growth rate and trade openness indicator jointly affect foreign direct investment,
and its significance has to be tested by an F-test, and cannot be ascertained from the
estimated t-values, however, the coefficients of the interaction terms do establish significant
interaction among the variables.24 F-test25 suggests that GRGDP is insignificant at 5%
level, however TOI and INF are significant at 5% and 1% level, respectively. Opening up
the economy to international trade helps attracting foreign capital owing to the positive
signal it provides to foreign enterpreneurs.26
Till now, we analyzed the effect of the consumption aid and development aid on FDI
and we concluded from our empirical exercise, following our theoretical framework, that
none of the aid variables have any significant impact on FDI. However, there might be some
omitted interaction effects between aid and other independent variables. We explore the
24Consider a model, y = α + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X1X2 + β4X3 + . We have: (1)
∂E(y)
∂X1
= β1 + β3X2,
(2) ∂E(y)
∂X2
= β2 + β3X1, and (3)
∂E(y)
∂X3
= β4. Significance of variable X3 can be tested using the ‘t’ test.
However, significance of variables X1 and X2 cannot be tested using ‘t’ test on X1 and X2. Apart from
direct effect on y, X1 and X2 also affects y by an interaction term, X1X2. For the effect of X1 on y to be
statistically significant, the following null hypothesis has to be rejected (H0 = β1 = β3 = 0, HA: H1 is not
true.) and joint significance of two variables can be tested only by an F-test.




= α6 + α7INF , which implies that
∂E(FDI)
∂TOI
> 0 whenever INF > −α6
α7
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possibility of interaction of aid variables with current account balance and socioeconomic
infrastructure. Karakaplan et al. [76] and Ram [97] have pointed out a possibility that
effect of aid on FDI and economic growth might have a stronger effect in presence of
good governance. In light of this proposition, apart from the other independent variables
and interaction effects, we introduce two new interaction terms; Consaid × CABAL and
Devaid× SEI. We estimate model (2) as:
FDIit = α0i + α1CONSAIDit + α2DEV AIDit + α3CONSAID × CABAL
+ α3DEV AID × SEI + α4GDPit + α5GRGDPit + α6INFit + α7TOIit
+ α8INFit × TOIit + α9SEIit + α10EDUit
+ α11CABALit + α12GRGDP × INF + α13TARIFFit + it
(3.15)
Our results are tabulated in table 3.3. We find that both Consaid and Devaid has sta-
tistically significant (at 5%) interaction with CABAL and SEI, respectively, and all other
variables have similar signs as in our previous model. Due to the interaction effect, the
effect of Devaid on FDI depends upon the level of SEI; the higher the level of infrastruc-
ture, the higher the partial effect of Devaid on FDI. However, the answer to how Consaid
and Devaid affect FDI depends upon the value of CABAL and SEI, respectively. Our
F-test on all the interaction variables suggest that Consaid, SEI, INF and CABAL are
significant at 1%, whereas Devaid, TOI, and GRGDP are significant at 5%. When cur-
rent account balance is sufficiently high (approximately above 10 million US$), we have a
crowding out effect of foreign direct investment due to consumption aid. Current account of
an economy comprises of balance on goods and services and balance on unilateral transfers.
The capital account is subdivided into capital account proper and official reserve account.
When a country receives a consumption aid (consumption aid is used by the recipient gov-
ernment to finance non-production, consumption expense such as, budget deficit financing),
current account balance improves and the current account surplus country exports capital
into the world market which reduces its net inflow of FDI. Therefore, a current account
surplus nation experiences crowding out of foreign private investment.
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Devaid affects inflow of FDI directly and also, indirectly, through its effect on SEI.
Development aid is utilized by the recipient economy in financing infrastructure projects
that aid production directly. Devaid strengthens the current account balance of the coun-
try. A current account surplus country will tend to export capital into the world market.
However, in presence of a strong socioeconomic infrastructure, there will be an additional
crowding in effect that will outweigh the exodus of capital. Therefore, for a country with
an average score on socioeconomic infrastructure index, a crowding in effect of Devaid on
foreign direct investment is observed. Trade openness indicator (TOI) affects inflow of FDI
positively at average or above average inflation. This might be slightly surprising, however,
it can be explained with the following argument. For a developing country plagued with
high rates of inflation, it helps to open up the country to international trade. It seems, for
foreign investors, trade openness indicator is a more important factor to consider compared
to inflation.27 One reason could be that in developing countries, wage is generally not
indexed to prices, and therefore, higher prices do not manifest itself to higher wages and
does not dampen the influx of foreign capital. Growth rate of GDP is significant at 5%.
An emerging economy can attract foreign direct investment only at low levels of inflation.28
At higher levels of inflation, the crowding out effect due to higher inflation wipes out the
lucrativeness of investing in an emerging economy.
Socioeconomic infrastructure (SEI) is significant at 1% level of significance. Effect
of SEI on FDI depends upon Devaid. Higher the Devaid, stronger is the effect of SEI
on net inflow of FDI. Higher Devaid implies greater spending on infrastructure projects
that strengthens socioeconomic infrastructure, which in turn crowds in private investment.
Effect of current account balance (CABAL) on inflow of FDI depends upon consumption
aid. When consumption aid is very high, CABAL improves. As current account balance
strengthens further, a current account surplus economy exports capital in the world market
causing an efflux of capital, resulting in reduction of net inflow of foreign direct investment
27Referring to the partial derivative ∂FDI
∂TOI
= α6 + α7INF . At higher values of INF , we find
∂FDI
∂TOI
becomes positive, given our estimated coefficients α6 and α7
28Referring to the partial derivative ∂FDI
∂GRGDP
= α5 + α12INF ,
∂FDI
∂GRGDP
is positive for very low values
of INF . At higher values of INF , we find ∂FDI
∂TOI
becomes positive, given our estimated coefficients α6 and
α7
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into the country. Inflation is statistically significant at 1% level of significance. Effect
of inflation on FDI is dependent upon TOI and GRGDP . For near-autarkic, emerging
economies, the effect of inflation tends to be negative on FDI. For an economy which
doesn’t engage in trade in international market (low TOI), even if it’s an emerging economy
(high GRGDP ), inflation crowds out foreign investment. However, what’s surprising is that
negative effect of inflation can be balanced by the positive effect of high degree of openness
to international trade, which suggests that for foreign investors, trade openness indicator
may be relatively more important to consider than inflation.
3.5 Concluding remarks
Foreign aid and foreign direct investment are two very important sources of capital for
resource-constrained developing countries. Foreign direct investment is made by a company
based in one country into a company based in another country and has a significant degree
of control over management and ownership (typically 10% or more, as per OECD), either
through establishment of subsidiary or associate company, a merger or joint venture or,
by acquisition of shares and stocks; whereas foreign aid is more like a unilateral transfer
from a donor to a recipient for the purpose of promoting welfare and economic development
in emerging economies. Although the purpose of the two types of flows are different, our
theory suggests that foreign aid does crowd out foreign private investment under certain
conditions, for certain types of aid.
To investigate this question, we have attempted to empirically testify two propositions
of the theory that in a three-sector (foreign investment funded export sector, domestic
capital funded import competing sector and foreign aid financed public sector) developing
economy, (a) foreign aid, if used in financing public consumption, may crowd in (out) foreign
direct investment, provided the import competing sector is less (more) capital intensive
relative to the public sector; (b) foreign aid, if used to finance production/improvement of
underlying infrastructure, will always crowd in foreign direct investment, depending upon
the sectoral relative factor intensity, less capital intensive the import sector, greater will
be the crowding in effect. Results indicate that public consumption aid does crowd out
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Table 3.2: Estimation results for model 1
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic
Intercept -4.9871 2.1776 -2.2901 **
Consaida 0.0011 0.0020 0.5584
Devaid 3.43× 10−5 0.0001 0.3430
Gross domestic productb 0.0330 0.0012 27.03 ***
Growth rate of GDP 0.0086 0.0320 0.2684
Inflation -0.0162 0.0370 -0.4374 ***
Trade openness indicator 0.1023 0.6189 0.1653 **
INF × TOI 0.0794 0.0321 2.4735 **
Socioeconomic infrastructure 2.9098 1.4353 2.0272 **
Education 1.5449 1.6709 0.9246
Current account balance 0.0958 0.0095 10.1207 ***
INF ×GRGDP -0.0041 0.0021 -1.9524 *
Tariff -0.0467 0.0275 -1.6980 *
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.
a Source: OECD website (http://stats.oecd.org)
b Source: World Development Indicators database
Table 3.3: Estimation results for model 2
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic
Intercept -3.9761 2.1893 -1.8161 *
Consaid 0.00094 0.00088 1.0643
Devaid -0.0014 0.0006 -2.2667 **
Consaid× CABAL -0.0001 4.1665× 10−5 -2.40 **
Devaid× SEI 0.0014 0.0006 2.3334 **
Gross domestic product 0.0341 0.0014 24.3571 ***
Growth rate of GDP 0.0077 0.0318 0.2423 **
Inflation -0.0151 0.0342 -0.4408 ***
Trade openness indicator -0.6054 0.8561 -0.7072 ***
INF × TOI 0.0778 0.0321 2.4213 **
Socioeconomic infrastructure 2.403 1.4392 1.6696 ***
Education 0.9368 1.6509 0.5674
Current account balance 0.1418 0.0170 8.3221 ***
INF ×GRGDP -0.0043 0.002 -2.15 **
Tariff -0.0381 0.0287 -1.3260
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.
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private investment in current account surplus developing countries. Public consumption
aid often utilized by developing countries to bridge government budget deficit29 and we
infer from our analysis that such type of aid crowds out foreign private investment. Also,
development aid crowds in private investment in presence of sound macroeconomic, political,
legal, and administrative machineries. Development aid, utilized to fund infrastructure
projects, encourages foreign direct investment into the country, by improving the basic
amenities available for production. So, developing countries should direct aid to projects
aiming at bettering social overhead capital and social infrastructure, that will crowd in
foreign direct investment into the country.
Due to this crowding in and crowding out effect of foreign direct investment, our theory
has a clear policy implication. Developing countries should be aware of the effects of foreign
aid on foreign direct investment. Instead of depending on foreign aid for financing public
consumption, it should invest the same in projects that aim at improving the economic and
social infrastructure of the nation that’ll attract more foreign investment.
29Difference between government expense and revenue, typically occurs as a result of administrative
inefficiency (caused by widespread tax evasion, imprudent government expenditure), reduction in tax rate
or, increase in government expenditure, which is generally financed through taxation, public borrowing or
foreign aid. Long term budget deficit might have severe repercussions on the country’s financial credibility
as it continually fails to repay its borrowings from the world market. Budget deficit is said to be inflationary
as it goes on transferring its burgeoning deficit into the indefinite future.
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Chapter 4
Determination of Socioeconomic Infrastructure
4.1 Introduction
Development of socioeconomic infrastructure1 is a government venture in most coun-
tries, partly owing to its low return on investment, and partly because, in a capitalistic
structure, the role of a government is relegated to provision and maintenance of basic pro-
duction facilities, along with developing business climate conducive to domestic and foreign
ventures. How much socioeconomic infrastructure is produced in an economy depends
upon several parameters that determine the demand for infrastructure arising from busi-
nesses operating within the borders of the country. It also might depend upon the domestic
government’s ability to provide the basic production facilities.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a very important source of capital for develop-
ing countries, and from chapter two, we inferred that socioeconomic infrastructure is an
important factor in mobilizing FDI across developing countries. In this light, analyzing
the factors behind determination of socioeconomic infrastructure is an important issue for
developing countries. Developing a sound socioeconomic infrastructure will not only al-
leviate production inefficiencies in domestic businesses, but, will also encourage foreign
entrepreneurs to invest in the country by improving the overall business ambiance. So, it is
very crucial to study factors that affect socioeconomic infrastructure in developing countries
from an empirical point of view for policy makers to enable them to take concrete steps in
strengthening the nation’s infrastructure.
In “Governance, institutions, and regional infrastructure in Asia”, De [44] empirically
analyzed the proposition that regional infrastructure is influenced by regional governance
and a host of other factors, for a group of 98 Asian countries, in a cross-section study.
1SEI, as defined in chapter 1.
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He created an index for regional infrastructure by combining factors, such as, roadways,
railways, airports, seaports, telecommunication and electricity, using principal component
analysis. For measure of regional governance, he considered the six governance indicators
created by World Bank (described in chapter 1); voice and accountability, political stabil-
ity and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and
control of corruption in six different regressions (each regression contained one governance
indicator) and also constructed a governance indicator by taking an arithmetic mean of all
the six measures, and concluded that countries and regions with higher income, stronger
institutions, better governance, and more open economies are likely to have higher levels of
regional infrastructure. He also made a strong case that, other things being equal, mem-
bership in regional organizations is not critical for developing regional infrastructure, what
matters is good governance. His paper put forward a policy implication that improving
governance at the regional level may be helpful for improving local governance, given the
possibility of regional diffusion, subsequently leading to regional infrastructure development.
Our work differs from De [44] in two ways. First, we consider a larger set2 of only
developing countries for a span of nine years (2002–2008), in a panel econometric analysis.
We use multiple imputation to deal with missing data to avoid list wise deletion of countries
with incomplete information. Advantages of this technique has been documented in previous
chapters.3 Secondly, our socioeconomic infrastructure index contains both physical as well
as social infrastructure parameters.
In chapter 1, we constructed an index of socioeconomic infrastructure for 145 develop-
ing countries in two stages. In the first stage, we created two indices, physical infrastructure
index and social infrastructure index, using the multivariate technique of principal compo-
nents. In construction of an index of physical infrastructure, we combined variables; road
density, electricity consumption per capita, energy consumption per capita, telephone main-
lines per 100 population, internet subscribers per 100 population with eigenvalues (0.1230,
0.4178, 0.2472, 0.7241, 0.4742). In construction of social infrastructure, we combined vari-
2We have gathered data for 114 developing countries.
3Interested readers can also refer to appendix A.1 for detailed discussion on multiple imputation.
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ables; voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence and terrorism, rule
of law, control of corruption, government effectiveness and regulatory quality with eigen-
values (0.4805, 0.3984, 0.3990, 0.3934, 0.3838, 0.3863). In the second stage, we constructed
our index of socioeconomic infrastructure by combining PII and SII indices with eigenvalues
(0.4847, 0.8747), the ratio obtained by principal components.
One of the most important factors in the determination of a nation’s infrastructure
is the intensity of economic activity per person, which can be proxied by per capita gross
domestic product. Large per capita GDP is indicative of a large market that implies greater
economic activity in the country which might exert a pressure on the government to provide
and maintain better production facilities. Also, GDP per capita indicates the level of devel-
opment of the economy and relatively more developed countries (countries with higher per
capita GDP) tend to have superior infrastructure facilities. Another measure of the inten-
sity of economic activity in the country is the total investment as a percent of GDP. Higher
the total investment, more pressing will be the need for a better infrastructure, to facilitate
productive activities. Trade openness indicator, defined as the proportion of exports and
imports relative to gross domestic product, reflects how integrated the economy is with the
rest of the world. An economy more exposed to foreign competition will require a sound
improve the business operational efficiency, which might be a reason for the government to
develop and maintain the economy’s infrastructure.
Another important factor might be the presence of a large government. Development
and maintenance of infrastructure is mostly undertaken by government or public organi-
zations in developing countries.4 Government size, reflected in government expenditure
per capita indicates how large the government is, acts as a proxy for the extent to which
the government might be able to operate in the economy. Apart from the size of govern-
ment, the funds the government has at its disposal to finance infrastructure projects is
another important factor in the determination of socioeconomic infrastructure. Although
government revenue per capita is a very crude measure of government funds alloted for
4Although governments in developing countries, since 2005, are increasingly relying on Public Private
Partnerships (PPP) or, Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) arrangements to attract private invest-
ment and financing to infrastructure sectors [98].
58
financing infrastructure projects, because the government revenue is spent on numerous
other projects, apart from infrastructure-related projects, this is the closest we could get
to capturing available government funds. Also, we are unable to ascertain what percent of
this government revenue is spent directly on infrastructure. In spite of these shortcomings,
we attempt to explain our constructed socioeconomic infrastructure index, analyzing these
factors in a panel econometric framework.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines an empirical
model, followed by a section on results and policy discussion. Section 4.4 concludes.
4.2 Empirical model
Our empirical model is used to analyze the determinants of a developing country’s
socioeconomic infrastructure (SEI). SEI is dependent upon control variables representing
the factors affecting infrastructure, such as per capita income, population, industry value
added and trade openness. We formulate our model as,
SEI = f(GDPpc,GOV REV pc,GOV EXpc, TOI, TINV, POP,MV A) (4.1)
where, SEI is the constructed index of socioeconomic infrastructure of a country, GDPpc
is the per capita gross domestic product, GOV REV pc is the total revenue earned by the
government in form of taxes, social contributions, grants and other sources, divided by the
midyear population, GOV EXpc consists of total expense and the net acquisition of non-
financial assets, divided by the midyear population, TOI is the trade openness indicator
calculated as the sum of exports and imports over GDP and TINV is the ratio of total
investment and GDP , where, investment or gross capital formation is measured by the total
value of the gross fixed capital formation and changes in inventories and acquisitions less
disposals of valuables in the country, POP is the population of the country recorded in
million persons, MVA is the manufacturing, value added, measured in billion US$.
The equation utilizes panel data. Panel data has several advantages over separate
time series or cross-section data in terms of more accurate inference of model parameters,
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greater capacity for capturing the complexity of human behavior, simplifying computation
and statistical inferences. Some of the benefits pointed out by Baltagi [96] and Cheng [99]
are that; a panel dataset relates to a number of subjects over time which is bound to bring
heterogeneity in these units, which can also be explicitly taken into account by introducing
individual-specific variables. Also, by combining time series and cross-section observations,
panel data provides more information, less variability, greater degrees of freedom and there-
fore, more efficient estimates. By studying repeated cross-sections over a long period of
time, panel data is more suited to study the inter temporal and dynamic relationships
among economic variables.
Modeling panel data requires capturing the heterogeneity of subjects in the dataset.
Covariance model, or, fixed effect model (advocated by Mundlak [91]; Wallace and Hussain
[92]) suggests adding a cross-section specific and/or time specific parameter (α0i and v1t
respectively) in the regression equation to account for heterogeneity. Consider the following
equation.
yit = α0i + v1t +X
>B + it (4.2)
where, i represents cross-section and t represents time period. α0i and v1t are the cross-
section and time specific characteristics to capture heterogeneity among subjects.
Instead of a cross-section and/or time-specific intercept term, error component, or,
random effect model (developed by Balestra and Nerlove [93]) considers the subject and
time-specific component to be random and includes it in the equation disturbance term as;
yit = β0 +X
>B + it (4.3)
yit = β0 +X
>B + (ui + vt + wit) (4.4)
where, ui, vt are the cross-section and time specific components, respectively, and wit is the
equation error term, and all the components are mutually uncorrelated with each other.
Random effects model leads to consistent and efficient estimates as far as the individual
and time characteristics (ui and vt) are uncorrelated with the included explanatory variables,
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that is, E(X>) = 0. If this assumption is violated, such that, E(X>) 6= 0, then the ran-
dom effect estimates become biased, inconsistent and inefficient. Under such circumstances,
cross-section and/or time specific characteristics are treated as parameters in the regression
equation, and fixed effect estimates are consistent and efficient. Hausman [95] test formally
tests the null hypothesis E(X>) = 0 against the alternate hypothesis E(X>) 6= 0. If we
fail to reject the null hypothesis, random effect estimates are consistent and efficient, or
else, we estimate the equation as a fixed effect model.
The data employed in this study was collected from the International Monetary Fund
2011 database. Table C.1 provides a description and summary statistics of the data. We
use a pooled5 dataset of 114 developing countries over a 9-year period from 2000–2008. Our
dataset, therefore, consists of 1026 observations per variable.
The variables in our study are; index of socioeconomic infrastructure (SEI), per
capita gross domestic product (GDPpc), per capita government expenditure (GOV EXpc),
per capita government revenue (GOV REV pc), total investment as a percent of GDP
(TINV ), trade openness indicator (TOI), population (POP ) and manufacturing value
added (MVA).6 We use multiple imputation to deal with the problem of missing data.7
Table 4.1 indicates the proportion of missingness for each variable in our dataset.
Table 4.1: Missingness pattern in variables
Variable Proportion of missingness (%)
Socioeconomic infrastructure (SEI) 0
Per capita gross domestic product (GDPpc) 0.63
Per capita government revenue (GOVREVpc) 1.17
Per capita government expenditure (GOVEXpc) 2.71
Trade openness indicator (TOI) 0.18
Total investment over GDP (TINV) 0.27
Population (POP) 0.63
Manufacturing value added (MVA) 5.87
5Pooled data stacks all cross-sections together across several time periods, without discriminating across
either. Or, in other words, each cross-section has the same intercept and slope coefficient for all explanatory
variables, over every period of time.
6GOV EXpc, GOV REV pc, MVA are measured in billion $, GDPpc is measured in thousand $, TINV
measured as % of GDP , TOI and SEI are unit-free measures, POP is measured in million persons.
7For technical details of multiple imputation technique, refer to appendix A.2.
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Multiple imputation is a Monte Carlo approach to analysis of incomplete data, de-
scribed by Rubin [38] in the context of nonresponse in sample surveys. However, it is
general enough to be used for non survey data as well. It is essentially nothing but solving




(m). Each of the ‘m’ datasets are then analyzed by
complete data econometric techniques, and the ‘m’ results are then combined using Ru-
bin’s formula [38]. The variability in the ‘m’ results serves as a measure of uncertainty due
to missingness, which combined with sample variation, provides us with an estimate and
variance of the parameters of interest.8 The diagnostic graphs for checking the fit of the
imputation model are presented in figures C.1-C.3 in appendix C and explained in the next
section.
Our empirical model attempts to explain SEI by the size of government (GOV EX),
government’s revenue base (GOV REV ), trade openness indicator (TOI), per capita GDP
(GDPpc), total investment as a percentage of GDP (TINV ), population (POP ), and
manufacturing value added (MVA). Our equation can be written as:
SEIit = α1i + β1GDPpcit + β2GOV REV pcit + β3GOV EXpcit + β4TOIit
+ β5TINVit + β6POPit + β7MVAit + it
(4.5)
Countries with higher per capita income tend to have better socioeconomic infras-
tructure.9 Development of infrastructure is largely a public sector undertaking for two
reasons. First, infrastructure is a vital, yet indirect, input in production. Presence of
proper infrastructure reduces production risk and uncertainty and therefore variability of
output associated with the production process. However, infrastructure is not marketable
and does not have a price attached to it, which makes it difficult for the private sector to
‘manufacture’ infrastructure. Hence, it has to be largely undertaken by the public sector.
Secondly, provision of infrastructure requires intergenerational transfer and reallocation of
8For detailed technical discussion of multiple imputation technique, interested readers can refer to
appendix A.1.
9We are not referring to any direction of causality here.
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resources and its return is not readily available to investors. So, private entrepreneurs will
not be very keen to devote resources to this sector, which requires the public sector to come
forward and bear the responsibility of provision and maintenance of infrastructure. For
these two reasons, presence of a large government, captured by the government size, is an
important factor in the determination of SEI. Presence of a large public sector may help
in proper channelization of required resources into production of infrastructure.
Government depends on its revenue base in order to finance any project. The total
revenue the government earns, from imposition of various kinds of taxes, unilateral transfers
from abroad and other sources of revenue, is partially spent on infrastructure enhancement
projects. So, government funds at hand is another important factor in determining the
quality of infrastructure in the economy.
Population size is a proxy for the size of labor force, a part of which is hired by the
public sector. Greater the labor force, better will be the infrastructure.
More open economies are expected to enjoy better infrastructure. For economies more
open to international trade, foreign competition will throw the domestic producers out of
business if the government does not strengthen infrastructure to raise operational efficiency
and reduce production uncertainty in risk-prone developing countries. More open economies
therefore ensure better infrastructure as a government response to foreign competition.
Total investment as a percentage of gross domestic product reflects the intensity of
productive activity in the economy. More national and foreign savings channelized into the
country’s investment implies more business opportunities, for which government requires to
strengthen infrastructure to encourage more business to operate in the country.
4.3 Results and policy discussion
Before we estimate the empirical model, owing to missing data, we are required to
conduct multiple imputation of the incomplete dataset to generate ‘m’ complete datasets.
We estimate our model and generate ‘m’ sets of results, which are then combined as per
the Rubin’s formula [38]. The diagnostic figures for the imputation model are reported in
the appendix in figures C.1-C.3.
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Compare graph (refer to figure C.1) plots the distributions of observed values and
imputed values in a single graph for each variable, to allow visual inspection of the fit of the
imputation model. For a good imputation model, the distribution of imputed values should
be as similar as possible to the distribution of observed values. This graph can be used
to check that the mean imputation falls within known bounds, when such bounds exist for
certain variables, in certain settings. Figure 4.1 presents the compare graphs for variables
GDPpc, GOV REV pc, GOV EXpc, MVA, POP , TOI and TINV respectively. Except
for TOI and TINV , whose imputed value distribution does not look very similar to their
observed value distribution, all other graphs look good.
Overimpute graph (refer to figure C.2) checks the accuracy of the fit of the imputation
model by generating several imputations for each of the observed values and creating a 95%
confidence interval for each, treating the observed values as missing. The imputed values
are then plotted against the observed values to visually verify if the mean imputed values
are close to the observed values or not. Line y = x is the line of perfect agreement and
for a good imputation model, most of the mean imputed values should lie close to the line
y = x. By checking how many confidence intervals cover the y = x line, we can understand
how accurate the imputation model is in predicting the missing values. All the overimpute
graphs look satisfactory.
Overdisperse graphs are presented in figure C.3. If the data to be imputed has a poorly
behaved likelihood, the expectation maximization (EM) algorithm might have problems in
finding the global maxima of the likelihood function, specially when it has more than one
mode. To make sure that our imputations do not depend on a starting value, a good
check is to run the EM algorithm from multiple dispersed starting values and to check
their convergence. In a well–behaved likelihood, all the chains converge to the same value
indicating that particular point to be the global maxima. In figure C.3, we do observe
convergence of all EM chains to the global maximum, indicating a good fit of the imputation
model.
After generating ‘m’ imputed datasets, we conduct econometric tests on each dataset
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and combine the ‘m’ results to take into consideration the uncertainty of missing data.
First, we check for the presence of heterogeneity in our pooled dataset by conducting the
poolability test10 [100], which tests for cross section and/or time effect against the null of a
pooled model. We find evidence of a cross-section effect.11 Hausman [95] test suggests the
use of fixed effects model, instead of the random effects model.12 We therefore estimate our
equation as a one-way fixed effect model.
Endogeneity among regressors and the equation disturbance term is a violation to OLS
(ordinary least squares) assumptions and may therefore result in biased and inconsistent
estimates. Suspecting a possible endogeneity between socioeconomic infrastructure index
and total investment (as a % of GDP), we carry out a Hausman endogeneity test [95], using
instruments such as unemployment rate and current account balance. We do find evidence
of endogeneity, and as a remedy, we replace the suspect variable with its lagged value. The
rationale behind this approach is that even though the contemporaneous value of TINV
may be correlated with the SEI score, the lagged value of TINV may not be. However, the
interpretation of such a regressor may be difficult as TINV (−1) is just a proxy of TINV
in the regression equation. We also report a 2SLS (two stage least squares) estimate of the
equation. 2SLS is named so, as it conducts ordinary least squares estimation at two different
stages. In the first stage, it regresses the suspected endogenous variable on all regressors
and instruments and records the predicted value of the suspected endogenous variable. In
the second stage, we replace the endogenous variable with the predicted value from stage
one regressions. 2SLS, therefore, deals with the endogeneity problem by estimating the
regression equation in two stages, to obtain unbiased and consistent estimates.
We present our results obtained from one-way FE model as well as our 2SLS estimates.
10Whether a cross-sectional characteristic, α0i or, a time characteristic, v1t should be included in the
regression or not can be determined by an F-test comparing the restricted sum of squares (when α0i =
v1t = 0) and the unrestricted sum of squares (α0i 6= 0, v1t 6= 0). Breusch–Pagan [94] (1980) LM test is
conducted for an error component (random effect) model to test for the presence of specific cross-sectional
and/or time-related effects in a three-component error term.
11The average computed F-statistic for ‘pooling vs. within’ test is 166.5464 ∼ F(122,977), for ‘pooling
vs. time’ test is 1.2237 ∼ F(984,115), and for ‘1-way vs. 2-way’ test is 1.3384 ∼ F(8,969). Tabulated values:
F∞,∞,0.05 = F∞,∞,0.05 = 0, F8,∞,0.05 = 1.94, F8,∞,0.01 = 2.51. Therefore, we reject presence of a two-way
effect in favor of a one-way (cross-section) fixed effect at 1%.
12The average Hausman test statistic is 90.0381 ∼ χ2(7) is significant at 1%.
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Our results (please refer to table 4.2) show that per capita gross domestic product has
a positive and statistically significant effect on socioeconomic infrastructure. Countries
with higher per capita income seem to exhibit better infrastructure. A large market size
generates demand for better socioeconomic infrastructure through two different channels.
On one hand, it provides opportunities for the domestic producers to exploit the growing
domestic demand in turn creating greater demand for better production and administrative
facilities; on the other hand, a large market size also tends to attract foreign entrepreneurs,
which creates pressure on the governments of developing countries to maintain and improve
the basic production facilities to remove production inefficiencies.
As per our one-way FE model, per capita government expenditure, a proxy for the
size of government, positively affects socioeconomic infrastructure. This is not surprising,
because infrastructure is typically a public sector undertaking in most developing countries.
A large per capita government expenditure implies presence of a large public sector that
can undertake welfare-enhancing projects such as development and maintenance of social
overhead capital and administrative policies conducive to production and consumption.
However, according to our 2SLS estimates, this factor is not significant.
Per capita government revenue, is positive and significant as expected. Government
depends upon taxes and other kinds of receipts to build its resource base which is then
spent on infrastructure and other welfare enhancing projects. Bigger the revenue base, more
funds will be at the government’s disposal to finance such welfare-enhancing infrastructure
projects.
The significant and positive total investment as a percent of GDP term suggests that
a large investment demand leads to a better infrastructure as it puts pressure on the gov-
ernment to invest in infrastructure-related projects. Total investment proportional to GDP
reflects the intensity of business activity in the country. Higher the total investment, more
pressing will be the need for better infrastructure to reduce production and transmission
losses and for overseeing smooth operation of the production process.
All variables have taken their expected signs only for the exception of trade openness
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indicator which is negative and marginally significant in the one-way FE model. Trade
openness indicator was expected to be positive. More open the economy is, more pressure
will exist on the government of developing economies to improve and maintain infrastruc-
ture. A negative coefficient on TOI may be due to the presence of any omitted variables in
the regression.
To conclude, countries with higher per capita GDP (GDPpc), total investment as a
share of GDP (TINV ), per capita government expenditure (GOV EXpc) and per capita
government revenue (GOV REV pc) have better socioeconomic infrastructure. However,
more open economy does not necessarily imply presence of better infrastructure. Manufac-
turing value added (MVA) is not statistically significant in any model.
Table 4.2: Estimation results
Variable 1-way FE 2SLS
Constant 0.9503 *** 0.9807 ***
(0.0486) (0.0637)
lnGDPpc 0.0366 *** 0.0347 **
(0.0074) (0.0148)
GOVREVpc 0.0071 ** 0.0064 *
(0.0030) (0.0035)
GOVEXpc 0.0115 ** 0.0016
(0.0048) (0.0054)
POP 0.0003 -0.0007 *
(0.0005) (0.0004)








*** Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
* Significant at the 10% level.
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4.4 Concluding comments
Infrastructure provides the basic framework that facilitates production in an economy.
In developing countries, provision and maintenance of infrastructure is largely a public sec-
tor undertaking. It is therefore important to understand the factors behind the production
of infrastructure. Having defined infrastructure in terms of its physical as well as social
components (in chapter 1), this chapter analyses the determinants of socioeconomic infras-
tructure. Our results indicate that countries with higher per capita income tend to have
better infrastructure. Our analysis further suggests that presence of a prominently large
government with sufficient resources at its disposal maybe instrumental for development
of national infrastructure. Also, high investment demand may help mobilize resources into
the infrastructure sector. In modern capitalistic economies, role of government is ideally
relegated to maintenance of basic law and order in the society and provision of infrastruc-
ture for smooth operation of the economy. Presence of a large government therefore may
reflect in better socioeconomic infrastructure. A substantial part of the government revenue
is spent on infrastructure and other government-funded projects, which implies a positive
relationship between infrastructure and government revenue. However, an inverse relation
of infrastructure with trade openness indicator is counterintuitive. Intuition suggests that
trade openness indicator should encourage government to pour more funds into development
of its basic infrastructural facilities, although our study does not corroborate that fact.
We have considered infrastructure as a composite indicator of a country’s social over-
head capital along with its legal, political and administrative machineries, and named it
‘socioeconomic’ infrastructure because our intention was to model infrastructure as a deter-
minant of inflow of foreign direct investment into developing countries and in this chapter
we have explained the factors influencing socioeconomic infrastructure by the underlying
economic forces operating in the economy. First, it might be interesting to study the de-
terminants of the two components of socioeconomic infrastructure individually, factors that
affect physical infrastructure as well as social infrastructure. De [44] empirically addresses
an interesting proposition that governance quality, apart from other factors, affects phys-
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ical infrastructure and therefore the key to improving social overhead capital is proper
governance. We could have explored a richer set of explanatory variables. We have consid-
ered government size, government revenue, per capita GDP , total investment as a percent
of GDP , manufacturing value added, trade openness indicator, population and education
index as our regressors. A part of government revenue is used to finance infrastructure
projects. Data on the proportion of government revenue that is allocated to provision and
maintenance of infrastructure would have been a better variable to denote government funds




This dissertation titled ‘Foreign direct investment, socioeconomic infrastructure and
foreign aid in developing countries’ comprises of three chapters. Chapter 2 deals with
creating a socioeconomic infrastructure index comprising of physical and social infrastruc-
ture attributes for 145 developing countries, listed by the IMF’s World Economic Outlook
Report [80] during time period 2000–2008, using principal component analysis. Principal
component technique summarizes the information available in a multivariate system into
a smaller dimension to create a condensed measure of an attribute and also reflects the
importance of each factor in the created variable. We have created an index of physical
infrastructure and a measure of social infrastructure and then combined the two indices
to create an index of socioeconomic infrastructure. Countries like Barbados, Bahamas,
Chile, Hungary and Antigua and Barbuda top the list, whereas, Afghanistan, Iraq, Myan-
mar, Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia are among the least developed countries
in terms of socioeconomic infrastructure index as defined in this chapter. Ranks of all
countries based on physical, social and socioeconomic infrastructure is available in tables
2.5–2.8.
In chapter 3, we address the issue of foreign aid crowding out foreign investment. In
a three-sector general equilibrium model with two tradable sectors (exportable and import
competing) and a non traded public consumption good sector, we assume that foreign in-
vestment takes place in the exportable sector (which is compatible with the behavior of
multinational corporations in less developed countries), and the recipient country uses for-
eign aid to finance the production of the public consumption good. We show that such
foreign aid impedes foreign investment if importable sector is more capital intensive than
the public good sector. The reason is quite intuitive. An increase in foreign aid draws re-
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sources from the importable sector. As the capital intensity of importable sector is higher,
some labor will also have to be moved from the exportable sector to the public good sec-
tor. This would reduce the marginal product of foreign capital, which in turn would reduce
foreign investment. Along similar lines of argument, we do find a crowding in effect of devel-
opment aid on foreign investment. The theoretical model puts forward the two propositions
to be tested empirically – (1) foreign aid used to finance public consumption crowds out
foreign direct investment, and, (2) foreign aid that is used to fund infrastructure projects
in developing countries help crowd in foreign investment. Our empirical model attempts
to does verify these propositions. In presence of interaction effect of aid variables, we do
find a crowding in effect of development aid on foreign investment. The key results of
the chapter are as follows. First, consumption aid does crowd out foreign invstment when
current account balance is sufficiently high. Secondly, development aid does crowd in FDI
for an averagely sound (in terms of socioeconomic infrastructure) economy. Thirdly, for
developing countries plagued with inflation, it pays to open up to international trade to
allow influx of FDI. For a multinational organization or foreign investor, trade openness
indicator is a more crucial factor to consider compared to inflation in the recipient country.
Fourthly, a large developing country, in terms of market size, does claim a large share of
the foreign investment across nations.
Chapter 4 develops an econometric model to explain the factors determining socio-
economic infrastructure in a developing country. Infrastructure, in developing countries,
is mostly a government venture. How much infrastructure is developed and maintained is
contingent upon several factors prevalent in the country. The empirical exercise suggests
that size of government is an important factor in the sense that larger the government, larger
will be its administrative and productive capacity for allocating resources to developing basic
infrastructure in the country. Total investment as a percentage ofGDP is another important
factor that influences government’s decision to invest into infrastructure projects. More
productive the economy is, there will be more demand for better infrastructure facilities.
However, trade openness indicator seems to negatively influence infrastructure in a country,
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which seems to be logically unclear. There might be more factors explaining infrastructure
that have not been included in this model, which requires further investigation.
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Empirical research is often plagued with the ubiquitous problem of missing data. Miss-
ingness may occur due to subjects dropping out in the middle of a survey, unavailability of
sensitive information of subjects or countries over certain years in non-survey data, poor
maintenance of archives by data collection agencies and incomplete compilation of statistical
data by organizations. Whatever the reason, missing information has serious implications
for estimation of econometric models. As a remedy to incomplete data, investigators use
list wise or pairwise deletion, ad hoc methods of filling in values such as by educated guess-
work, mean imputation or, regression-based single imputation. List wise deletion deletes all
subjects having at least one missing observation for any of the variables in the dataset. This
method is helpful when the missingness is very low or, the dataset is very large such that
losing few subjects would not make a lot of difference. However, missingness is non-random
more often than not, and in such a case, deleting subjects in this manner may render the
sample unrepresentative and therefore any result from such unrepresentative data maybe
biased and inconsistent. Pairwise deletion, on the other hand, only removes the specific
missing value from the analysis (not the entire case) or, in other words, all available data
is included. For example, if we are conducting a correlation on multiple variables, then
we conduct bivariate correlation between all available data points and ignore only those
missing values that exist for some variables. Therefore, pairwise deletion utilizes more in-
formation compared to list wise deletion method. Pairwise deletion is particularly useful
when the sample size is small and missingness is high. However, due to its limited usability,
it is less widely used in comparison to list wise deletion in presence of missing data. Mean
imputation entails replacing the missing value with subject-specific variable mean, whereas,
regression substitution uses regression analysis to replace missing values by predicting one
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variable based on other variables. These imputation approaches seem better than list wise
or pairwise deletion as they do not reduce the sample size, however, by replacing with
mean or regressed values, they artificially reduce the variability of the variables and also
diminishes its relationship with other variables, as pointed out by Graham [101], therefore
affecting the reliability of the estimates. On the contrary, multiple imputation is a scientific
procedure that fills in missing values by generating ‘m’ (m > 1) complete datasets where
missing values are filled in keeping the observed values unchanged. Then each of the com-
pleted datasets are analyzed using complete data estimation techniques, and the individual
estimates are then combined by taking a simple average, to account for uncertainty about
the missing value.
Multiple imputation, just like parameter simulation, is a Monte Carlo approach to
analysis of incomplete data. The underlying philosophy of multiple imputation is the same
as that of expectation maximization (EM) and data augmentation. The EM algorithm
solves an incomplete data problem by repeatedly solving the complete data version of it. In







mis , after which the ‘m’ complete datasets are analyzed by standard complete data
statistical methods. The variability among the ‘m’ results provide an estimate about the
uncertainty due to missingness, which when combined with the sample variation in each
dataset provides a single estimate of variance for each parameter of interest. Unlike other
applications of Monte Carlo, where very large numbers of draws are required to attain the
desired level of accuracy, multiple imputation requires only 3–5 imputations to capture the
uncertainty of missing values. There are two fundamental reasons for this. First, multiple
imputation employs simulation to solve only the missing data part of the problem. Choosing
a very large ‘m’ to reduce Monte Carlo error does not result in a large gain in efficiency as
opposed to a small number of imputations because the Monte Carlo error is a very small
part of the overall inferential uncertainty in the problem. Mathematically, if the fraction
of missing information about a variable is λ, the relative efficiency (on a variance scale) of




, which implies that efficiency gained by creating and storing more imputations
will not be sufficiently justified. Second, the rules for combining the ‘m’ complete data
estimates explicitly account for the Monte Carlo error. Therefore, multiple imputation
does not require large number of simulations, 3–5 is sufficient to capture the uncertainty
due to missingness.
We carry out ‘m’ imputations and then combine the ‘m’ results to obtain a single
inferential statement about the parameters in question. The ‘overall’ estimate and ‘overall’
standard error are obtained using Rubin’s formula [38], which is discussed below.






where Qˆj is the estimated regression coefficient obtained from the jth (j = 1, 2, ....m)
imputed dataset.






where Uj is the computed variance associated with Qˆj . The between-imputation variance,





(Qˆj − Q¯)2 (A.3)
The ‘overall’ standard error combines both within and between variances, along with a










The overall degrees of freedom are given by














, is comparable to the students’
‘t’-distribution.
Missingness can be of three types (Honaker and King [102] and King et al. [103]):
1. Missingness Completely At Random (MCAR)
2. Non-ignorable (NI)
3. Missing At Random (MAR)
In missing completely at random pattern of missingness, an observation is unavailable com-
pletely by chance and cannot be recovered. For example, if the respondents decide to
respond to a survey question based on a coin toss, i.e., if the coin tosses head, the inter-
viewee responds, otherwise not. Missing observation generated through such a mechanism
cannot be retrieved. So, list wise deletion is the only solution to this problem and does not
generate biased, inefficient results.
In case of non-ignorable pattern of missingness, the probability that a cell value is
missing depends upon the unobserved value of missing response. If an attribute of low
income countries contains missingness and no variable in the dataset can predict which
countries have low income, such pattern of missingness is non-ignorable. In such a scenario,
the missing data cannot be recovered.
For missing at random pattern of missingness, the probability that a cell value is missing
may depend on observed data, but after controlling for observed data, must be independent
of missing data. For example, if high income individuals are more likely to refuse to answer
a particular question compared to low income individuals, and if this difference in income
level can be predicted by other variables in the dataset, then the pattern of missingness is
called MAR.
Missing data is recoverable if and only if the pattern of missingness is MAR. MAR
pattern of missingness is largely controlled by the analyst, rather than the world that
generates the data. So, MAR assumption can be made to fit the data by adding more
variables to the dataset that can help predict the pattern of missingness. The imputation
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model typically contains more number of variables compared to the analysis model, the
extra variables try to make the MAR assumption stronger to better fit the model.
Multiple imputation was not a very popular method even more than a decade ago,
partly owing to the complex imputation generating process. With the development of
Amelia II, a software embedded in R performing multiple imputation using bootstrap-
based EMB (combination of expectation maximization, EM and bootstrapping) algorithm,
multiple imputation became a more widely used technique of dealing with missing data. The
simple yet powerful EMB algorithm (a significant improvement over Amelia) in Amelia II
can run imputations in a small amount of time and it virtually never crashes. It can also
run accurate imputations for cross-section, time series and panel data and also allows for
prior observation information. In addition, it provides various diagnostic checks on its
imputations to verify the fit of the model. The imputation model of Amelia II assumes that
the complete data, D is multivariate normal, i.e., D ∼ Nk(µ,Σ), where µ is the mean vector
and Σ is the variance-covariance matrix of dimension k. Multivariate normal distribution is
often a very crude assumption for real time data. Transformations, such as ordinal, nominal,
natural log, square root and logistic transformations often make the normality assumption
more plausible.
Social science often deals with variables that fail to fit into a multivariate normal dis-
tribution. However, as discussed by King et al. [103], the multivariate normal assumption
works pretty well for the imputation stage. For example, if we are imputing a dichotomous
variable that takes value 0 if the respondent is male and 1 if the respondent is female, and
if this is not declared to Amelia, it can impute a value like 0.75 for the missing observa-
tion, which in this case would not make much sense. Although, non-integer imputation
often carries more information about the underlying distribution compared to the integer
imputation (often declared prior to running the algorithm), in most cases, it is advisable to
declare such a binary or ‘ordinal’ variable to Amelia. If we are imputing a categorical vari-
able such as form of government (0 for democracy, 1 for republic, and, 2 for autocracy), such
variable should be declared as ‘nominal’ to Amelia. If our variable is heavily skewed or has
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outliers, we can use the ‘natural logarithm’ transform to normalize the distribution. This
transformation will help Amelia to avoid imputing values that are too heavily dependent
on the outlying values. Some count data are often heavily skewed. Such a distribution can
be smoothened by taking the ‘square root’ transformation. If our data is sharply bounded
between 0 and 1, it should be declared to Amelia under ‘logistic’ transformation, or else,
the imputed data will fall out of range. Datasets often contain identification variables such
as country or respondents’ name or ID. Such variables should be marked as identification
variables and retained in the imputed dataset.
After the imputations are run and the complete datasets obtained, there are a few




The compare density graph is a diagnostic check of the fit of the imputation model. The
density of the mean of the ‘m’ (m > 1) imputed datasets are overlaid on the density of
the observed values to compare the shape of the density of imputed values. Although it is
impossible to have a graph in which the two distributions are exactly identical, the closer
the two densities are to each other, the better is the imputation model and more reliable
are the imputed complete datasets. Imputations that generate very different densities of
imputed values as compared to the observed values indicate that the imputation model
requires some more investigation and therefore some more improvement.
The overimpute graph is another way of checking the accuracy of the imputation model.
Assuming each observed value to be missing, we generate a large number of imputations for
each observation, such that we can construct a 90% confidence interval for imputations of
the actually observed values. We can then inspect whether the observed values fall within
the 90% confidence interval or not. We graph estimates of each (observed) value against
the true value of the observation. On this graph, y = x line is called the line of perfect
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agreement. If the imputation model is a perfect predictor of missing values, all values will
lie on the line of perfect agreement.
If the data supplied to the software ‘Amelia’ does not have a well-behaved likelihood,
the EM algorithm (which is deterministic) might not be able to locate the global maxima
(if the data has a multi-modal distribution). This graph ensures that the algorithm’s ability
to locate the global maxima is independent of the starting values. It plots the convergence
of the EM algorithm from various starting values to check whether it is converging to the
same point or not. In case of a well-behaved likelihood, EM chains from different starting
values will converge to the same value. The overdisperse diagnostic plots the graph of the
paths of each chain. By visual inspection, it can be checked whether the chains converge to
the same point or not.
In our subsequent chapters, we do use this technique of multiple imputation whenever
we encounter incomplete data and check the fit of our model using the three diagnostic
figures.
87
A.2 A Mathematical Approach to Principal Component Analysis
Let us assume random variables, X1, X2, ...., Xp, have a certain multivariate distribu-
tion with mean vector, µ and covariance matrix, Σ. We also assume that the matrices µ and
Σ are finite and the ‘q’ largest characteristic roots of Σ are distinct (λ1 > λ2 > ... > λq).
From this population of infinite members, an N-member sample is selected on ‘p’ at-
tributes/factors and the data matrix X is given by

X11 X12 . . . X1p





XN1 XN1 . . . XNp

Our sample covariance matrix, S, will contain the information we need for our PC
analysis. We calculate the first principal component by maximizing the sample variance
maxSY 21 =
∑∑
ai1aj1Sij = a´1S1a1 (A.6)
where, i = 1, 2, ....p and j = 1, 2, ....p, such that the constraint a´1a1 = 1 is met. Our first
order condition is
∂(SY 21 + λ1(1− a´1a1))
∂a1
= 2(S − λ1I)a1 = 0 (A.7)
|S − λ1I| = 0 (A.8)
where, λ1 is the characteristic root of the covariance matrix, S, and a1 is it’s associated
characteristic vector. The first principal component of the observations, X1, X2, ...., Xp, is
the linear compound
Y1 = a11X1 + .....+ ap1Xp = a´1X (A.9)
where, a11, ....., ap1 are the weights attached to the ‘p’ attributes. The weights denote the
importance of each factor in the composite measure.
88
Similarly, the second principal component (Y2 = a12X1+a22X2+....+ap2Xp) is obtained
from the following maximization problem:
maxSY 22 =
∑∑
ai2aj2Sij = a´2S2a2 (A.10)
such that the constraints a´2a2 = 1 and a´1a2 = 0 are met. The first constraint just rescales
the coefficients, whereas, the second constraint imposes the condition that a2 is orthogonal
to a1.
The jth principal component obtained is given by
Yj = a1jX1 + a2jX2 + ....+ apjXj (A.11)
The sample variance of the jth component is λj , therefore, λ1 + λ2 + ....+ λp = tr(S).
The aim of PCA is to summarize most of the information present in ‘p’ variables to condense
into a composite measure.
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Table A.1: Description of SEI variables and summary statistics
Variable Definition Mean SD
Road density Total road network includes motorways, highways, and
main or national roads, secondary or regional roads, and
all other roads in a country, divided by the country’s total
land area.
0.0383 0.0630
Electricity consumption per capita Electric power consumption measures the production of
power plants and combined heat and power plants less
transmission, distribution, and transformation losses and
own use by heat and power plants.
0.0966 0.1494
Energy consumption per capita Energy use refers to use of primary energy before trans-
formation to other end-use fuels, which is equal to indige-
nous production plus imports and stock changes, minus
exports and fuels supplied to ships and aircraft engaged
in international transport.
0.0502 0.1029
Internet subscribers per 100 popu-
lation
Internet users are people with access to the worldwide
network.
0.1171 0.1573
Telephone mainlines per 100 popu-
lation
Telephone lines are fixed telephone lines that connect a
subscriber’s terminal equipment to the public switched
telephone network and that have a port on a telephone
exchange. Integrated services digital network channels
ands fixed wireless subscribers are included.
0.2084 0.2123
Voice and accountability (voice) Capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country’s
citizens are able to participate in selecting their govern-
ment, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of asso-
ciation, and, a free media.
0.5309 0.2302
Political Stability and Absence of
Violence and Terrorism (pol)
Capturing perceptions of the likelihood that the govern-
ment will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitu-
tional or violent means, including politically-motivated
violence and terrorism.
0.6261 0.1961
Rule of Law (rule) Capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood
of crime and violence.
0.5116 0.1715
Control of Corruption (corrupt) Capturing perceptions of the extent to which public
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty
and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of
the state by elites and private interests.
0.5148 0.1741
Government Effectiveness (gov) Capturing perceptions of the quality of public services,
the quality of the civil service and the degree of its inde-
pendence from political pressures, the quality of policy
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of
the government’s commitment to such policies.
0.5222 0.1697
Regulatory Quality (reg) Capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations
that permit and promote private sector development.
0.5418 0.1758
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Diagnostic Checks for Assessing the Fit of the Imputation Model for Socioeco-
nomic Infrastructure Variables
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Fig. A.1: Compare graphs for the physical infrastructure variables
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Fig. A.2: Compare graphs for the social infrastructure variables
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Fig. A.3: Overimpute graphs for the physical infrastructure variables
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Fig. A.4: Overimpute graphs for the social infrastructure variables
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Fig. A.5: Overdisperse graphs for the physical infrastructure variables
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Fig. A.6: Overdisperse graphs for the social infrastructure variables
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Appendix B
B.1 Derivation of Equations (3.7) and (3.8) of Chapter 2




I = T (B.1)
From equation (3.4), we have Xe =
Ke
aKe





























T = − aIm
aKm
K (B.3)









T = − aIm
aKm
K (B.4)
Equation (B.4) is our equation (3.7) in our model (page 35).





























































Replacing value of r by pmaKm in equation (B.10) and rearranging, we get
Kˆe =
















I and km =
Km
Im
= aKmaIm . Equation (B.12) is our equation (3.8) in our
model (page 35).
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Table B.1: Description of FDI and foreign aid variables and summary statistics
Variable Definition Mean SD
Public consumption aid Gross disbursement of official development assistance re-
ceived from all donors in order to finance public con-
sumption, measured in current US dollars (million).
136.24 205.61
Development aid Gross disbursement of official development assistance re-
ceived from all donors in order to finance public con-
sumption, measured in current US dollars (million).
416.27 794.95
Current account balance Current account is all transactions other than those in
financial and capital items. The major classifications are
goods and services, income and current transfers. The
focus of the BOP is on transactions (between an economy
and the rest of the world) in goods, services, and income.
Data are in current US dollars (billion).
2.66 23.28
Gross domestic product GDP at purchasers price is the sum of gross value added
by all resident producers in the economy plus any product
taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of
the products. It is calculated without making deductions
for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and
degradation of natural resources. Data are in current US
dollars (billion).
82.10 295.86
Growth rate of GDP Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices
on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on con-
stant 2000 US dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value
added by all resident producers in the economy plus any
product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in
the value of the products. It is calculated without mak-
ing deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for
depletion and degradation of natural resources.
5.66 4.47
Trade openness indicator Sum of exports and imports of goods and services over
gross domestic product.
0.58 0.42
Foreign direct investment Foreign direct investment are the net inflows of invest-
ment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 per-
cent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operat-
ing in an economy other than that of the investor. It is
the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other
long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the
balance of payments. This series shows net inflows (new
investment inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting




Table B.2: Description of FDI and foreign aid variables and summary statistics (contd.)
Variable Definition Mean SD
Gross domestic product, per capita GDP per capita is gross domestic product (defined above)
divided by midyear population. Data are in current U.S.
dollars (thousands).
2877.51 3507.01
Socioeconomic infrastructure A ‘created’ index reflecting the physical and social infras-
tructure facilities in the economy.
1.23 0.39
Inflation Annual percentages of average consumer prices are year-
on-year changes.
7.79 8.37
Education index An index created by World Bank by combining variables,





), the ratio determined by the principal component
analysis technique.
0.73 0.18
Population For census purposes, the total population of the country
consists of all persons falling within the scope of the cen-
sus. In the broadest sense, the total may comprise either
all usual residents of the country or all persons present in
the country at the time of the census (million persons).
42.78 157.70
Working population Population ages 15 to 64 is the percentage of the total
population that is in the age group 15 to 64. Popula-
tion is based on the de facto definition of population,
which counts all residents regardless of legal status or
citizenship-except for refugees not permanently settled
in the country of asylum, who are generally considered
part of the population of the country of origin.
60.26 6.11
Tariff Weighted mean applied tariff is the average of effectively
applied rates weighted by the product import shares cor-
responding to each partner country.
8.81 5.01
Government revenue Revenue consists of taxes, social contributions, grants
receivable, and other revenue. Revenue increases gov-
ernment’s net worth, which is the difference between its




Diagnostic Checks for Assessing the Fit of the Imputation Model for FDI and
Foreign Aid Variables
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Fig. B.1: Compare graphs for the variables
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Fig. B.2: Overimpute graphs for the variables
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Fig. B.3: Overimpute graphs for the variables (contd.)
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Convergence of original starting values





































Convergence of original starting values


































Convergence of original starting values
























Convergence of original starting values































Convergence of original starting values




























Convergence of original starting values
Fig. B.4: Overdisperse graphs for the variables
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Convergence of original starting values































Convergence of original starting values


































Convergence of original starting values
Fig. B.5: Overdisperse graphs for the variables (contd.)
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Appendix C
Table C.1: Description of variables explaining SEI and summary statistics
Variable Definition Mean SD
Socioeconomic infrastructure A ‘created’ index reflecting the physical and social infras-
tructure facilities in the economy.
1.2814 0.4079
Trade openness indicator Sum of exports and imports of goods and services over
gross domestic product.
0.5862 0.4051
Gross domestic product, per capita GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by
midyear population. Data are in current U.S. dollars
(thousands).
3408.2135 5667.3862
Population For census purposes, the total population of the country
consists of all persons falling within the scope of the cen-
sus. In the broadest sense, the total may comprise either
all usual residents of the country or all persons present in
the country at the time of the census (million persons).
41.9055 153.8446
Government revenue, per capita Government revenue consists of taxes, social contribu-





Total government expenditure consists of total expense
and the net acquisition of non financial assets, divided
by midyear population.
1.7717 2.0765
Total investment, as % of GDP Expressed as a ratio of total investment in current local
currency and GDP in current local currency. Investment
or gross capital formation is measured by the total value
of the gross fixed capital formation and changes in in-
ventories and acquisitions less disposals of valuables for
a unit or sector.
23.0560 8.6391
Manufacturing value added Manufacturing refers to industries belonging to ISIC di-
visions 15-37. Value added is the net output of a sector
after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate
inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for
depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degra-




Diagnostic Checks for Assessing the Fit of the Imputation Model for Variables
Explaining Socioeconomic Infrastructure
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Fig. C.1: Compare graphs for the variables
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Fig. C.2: Overimpute graphs for the variables
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Convergence of original starting values


























Convergence of original starting values
























Convergence of original starting values
































Convergence of original starting values
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Convergence of original starting values
Fig. C.3: Overdisperse graphs for the variables
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Appendix D
List of Countries Used in the Study
Table D.1: Country classification based on region
East Asia & Pacific Europe & Central Asia Middle East & North Africa South Asia
Cambodia Albania Algeria Afghanistan
China Armenia Bahrain Bangladesh
Korea, Dem. Rep.*a+ Azerbaijan Djibouti Bhutan
Fiji Belarus Egypt, Arab Rep. India
Indonesia Bosnia and Herzegovina Iran, Islamic Rep. Maldives
Kiribati*+ Bulgaria*+ Iraq*+ Nepal
Lao PDR+b Croatia Jordan Pakistan
Mongolia Georgia Kuwait*+ Sri Lanka
Myanmar (Burma)+ Hungary*+ Lebanon
Papua New Guinea Kazakhstan Libya
Samoa*+ Kyrgyzstan Morocco
Solomon Islands Latvia*+ Oman
Tonga*+ Lithuania*+ Qatar*+
Vanautu+ Macedonia, FYR+ Saudi Arabia
Vietnam Moldova Syria
Malaysia Romania*+ Tunisia






a Countries excluded from chapter 2.
b Countries excluded from chapter 3.
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Table D.2: Country classification based on region
(contd.)
Latin America & Caribbean Sub-Saharan Africa







Chile Central African Republic
Colombia Chad
Costa Rica Comoros
Cuba*+ Congo, Dem. Rep.
Dominica*+ Congo, Rep.














St. Kitts and Nevis*+ Mali
St. Lucia Mauritania
St. Vincent and the Grenadines Mauritius
Suriname Mozambique
















a Countries excluded from chapter 2.
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